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Reconstructing Xunzi’s Moral Knowledge 
by 
CHAN Hok Nam 
Master of Philosophy  
 
Reconstructing the content of Xunzi’s (荀子) moral knowledge is the main goal 
of this thesis. A first main task of this reconstruction is to provide a clarification of 
the content and functions of li. A second primary goal of the reconstruction is to 
discuss the roles and functions of the moral sage or morally superior person, junzi 
(君子), in Xunzi’s account of moral practice. The figure of the sage is important in 
explaining the rationale of li and exemplifying how to behave in accordance with the 
rules of proper conduct in different situations. As truth is essential to knowledge, it is 
crucial to understand how moral belief can be truth-apt within Xunzian theory. To 
that end, the thesis reinterprets the doctrine in terms of Railton’s subjective 
naturalism. In the literature on Xunzi’s moral thought, the problem of the cognitive 
status of moral judgment has been neglected, and this thesis attempts to remedy this 
oversight. 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part one mainly elucidates the content of 
Xunzi’s moral knowledge. It includes an exposition of the origin and several 
functions of li and the significance of the sage and his or her close relation with li. In 
part two, the argument focuses on whether Xunzi’s moral knowledge is truth-apt and 
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Reconstructing Xunzi’s moral knowledge is the aim of this thesis. “Li” (禮), 1 
which is usually translated into “ritual”, “rites”, “propriety” or “rules of proper 
conduct”, plays an indispensable role in Xunzi’s moral thought. Thus, elucidating the 
content of li is the first task of the reconstruction of Xunzi’s moral knowledge. For a 
belief to be knowledge, it must be true. In other words, only when the content of li 
can be true, is it moral knowledge. Thus, explaining how the content of li can be true 
is the second task of my reconstruction. According to Xunzi, a moral sage or morally 
superior person, junzi (君子) can explain the rationale of li and exemplify how to 
behave in accordance with li in various situations because he or she is the founder of 
li. It seems that the Xunzian sage can be the resource for explaining how the content 
of li can be true. Moreover, for Xunzi, the sage is an ideal person in acquiring 
knowledge. He or she can avoid all the obstacles to knowing the truth, but also can 
consider all relevant aspects of things without neglecting or overplaying any one of 
the aspects in grasping true knowledge. By reinterpreting Xunzi’s moral thought in 
                                                
1
 In this thesis, I use pinyin transliteration rather than the Wade-Giles system except for the names of 
Chinese authors and titles of books which have been romanized already.  
 2 
terms of subjective naturalism, one of the contemporary metaethical theories, this 
characteristic of the sage can make the sage be the foundation of the truth of moral 
judgments. According to subjective naturalism, the truth of moral judgment is based 
on the attitudes or desires of an ideal person who not only can acquire all relevant 
factors for making moral judgments, but also is faultless in calculation and rational 
decision-making. The Xunzian sage can be treated as the ideal person suggested by 
subjective naturalism, and can thereby be seen as making the content of li true. Thus, 
the second task consists of two sub-tasks. One of these is the goal of elucidating 
Xunzi’s conception of the sage and his epistemology. Reinterpreting Xunzi’s moral 
thought in terms of subjective naturalism and expounding how the sage makes the 
content of li true under this new interpretation is the other task. 
Discussing the cognitive status of Xunzian moral judgment is the main theme of 
the project of reconstructing Xunzi’s moral knowledge. This thesis argues that 
Xunzian moral judgment is truth-apt, and elucidates what makes it true. The 
cognitive statue of moral judgments is one of the topics in metaethics. Actually, 
metaethics consists of several issues, for example, moral psychology, moral 
 3 
linguistics, moral epistemology, etc.
2
 Although in previous studies of Xunzi’s moral 
thought, some contemporary metaethical topics have been discussed, the cognitive 
status of moral judgment has not been taken up. This thesis tries to fill this blank.
3
 
Moreover, after reconstructing Xunzi’s moral thought, the thesis can give a 
counterexample to the prevalent view about the relation between normative ethics 
and metaethics. According to this view, any metaethical theory is logically 
independent from any normative ethical theory. According to this prevalent thought, 
Kant’s ethical theory can be interpreted in terms of some metaethical theories, such 
as emotivism, which argue that all moral judgment is non-cognitive. According to 
emotivism, all moral judgment is only an expression of one’s emotion and it has no 
truth value. When Kant’s ethical theory is interpreted in the light of emotivism, the 
categorical imperative, for example, “don’t tell any lies”, is only an expression of 
one’s emotion about the behavior of telling a lie. But this thought about the relation 
of normative ethics and metaethics cannot apply to the ethical thought of Xunzi. The 
                                                
2
 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 5-7. 
3
 A. S. Cua is the most distinctive scholar who discusses and reconstructs some metaethical issues in 
Xunzi’s moral thought. See, A. S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu’s Moral 
Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). As for the problems of moral motivation 
in Xunzian moral theory, some useful articles can be found in T. C. Kline Ⅲ and Philip J. Ivanhoe, 
eds., Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2000). Finally, JeeLoo Liu constructs ancient Confucianism as an objective moral realism. 
However, her discussion does not include Xunzi. See, JeeLoo Liu, “Confucian Moral Realism,” Asian 
Philosophy 17:2 (2007): 167-84.  
 4 
firm connection of the subjective naturalistic metaethical status and the content of 
substantive ethical rule in the moral knowledge of Xunzi will be shown in the course 
of my theoretical reconstruction of Xunzi’s moral thought. 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Elucidating the content of Xunzi’s moral 
knowledge is the goal of part one. In this part, firstly, the content of li is elucidated 
by introducing its origin and functions. Li can maintain social order because it has 
the functions of distributing resources and transforming human desires. The 
transformative function of li relates to Xunzi’s understanding of human nature. 
Discussing his idea of human nature is therefore one of the constituents of this part. 
Finally, the importance of the sage in moral practice is also discussed. The sage’s 
ability to acquire comprehensive knowledge leads to the discussion of Xunzi’s 
epistemology in part 2. 
In part two, xin, the faculty of cognition in Xunzi’s thought, and the factors of 
preventing people in knowing the truth are elucidated. After discussing these two 
related epistemological issues, subjective naturalism is briefly introduced. Thirdly, I 
discuss how Xunzi’s moral thought can be reconstructed in the light of subjective 
 5 
naturalism and how the sage can be source of the truth of Xunzi’s moral theory once 





The significance of li and the sage 
 
2.1 The origin and functions of li   
Li is one of the basic concepts in Confucian ethical theory. However, it is more 
significant in the ethical practice of Xunzi than in other Pre-Qin Confucians. Indeed, 
li is indispensable in his thought. There are several English translations of li. The 
most common ones are “ritual” or “rite”. However, in modern English, translating 
Xunzi’s conception of li into these two English words may be misleading because 
these two terms bear no moral implications or connotations.
4
 On the other hand, the 
content of li in Xunzi’s thought is richer than “ritual” and “rite”. Li originally meant 
“to sacrifice” in ancient Chinese. Initially, it also denotes ritual or ceremony. Later, 
the scope of application of this word extends to some ceremonialized social activities, 
such as behavior at court, meetings between ambassadors, mourning, marriage, 
                                                
4
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ordinarily, “rite” means 1) a formal procedure or act in 
a religious or other solemn observance; 2) a custom or practice of a formal kind; 3) the general or 
usual custom, habit, or practice of a country, people, class of persons, etc.; now spec. in religion or 
worship. When “ritual” is used as a noun, it means 1) the prescribed order of performing religious or 
other devotional service; 2) a book containing the order, forms, or ceremonies, to be observed in the 
celebration of religious or other solemn service; 3) ritual observances; ceremonial acts; 4) the 
performance of ritual acts. Xunzi’s conception of li overlaps with the above meanings of “rite” and 
“ritual”. But, obviously, modern ordinary meanings of these two English words have no moral 
meaning. 
 7 
communal festivities, etc. Finally, all standardized customs are equivalent to it. 
Nearly all social activities in daily life, such as ways of behaving toward rulers, 
parents, the old, siblings, teachers, guests, etc, and personal behavior, for example, 
clothing, eating, walking, etc, are regulated by li. Thus, this word acquires the 
connotations of “order” and “arrangement”.
5
 As Schwartz says, li includes all the 
familial and political roles and status as well as “all the prescriptions of behavior 
embedded in these institutions.”
6
 Furthermore, since Xunzi does not rule out the 
possibility that someone not only is unwilling to follow ritual practice, but also wants 
to break with such practice, in order to maintain social order it is necessary to 
threaten such persons by punishment. Thus, the implementation of li usually 
cooperates with the enforcement of laws.
7
 After elucidating the content and 
functions of li in the following sections, it will be clear that in Xunzi’s moral thought, 
li and morality are closely connected. The content of li contains substantive moral 
judgments, rules, standards, and a guidance of being morally sage. Thus, in this essay, 
the Chinese word “禮” is transliterated into pinyin “li” most of the time unless it is 
                                                
5
 Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1969), pp. 26-7. 
6
 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), p. 295. 
7
 This point is related to the distinction between capacity and ability drawn by Xunzi. See section 
2.2.6. 
 8 
appropriate to translate it into those corresponding English words in a given context.  
The content of li is set forth in the following sections. Firstly, the origin of li 
provided by Xunzi is discussed because the primary function of li can be grasped in 
these terms. 
 
2.2 The origin of li  
Xunzi conceives of a hypothetical situation in order to explain why people need 
li. In this situation, there is no li or rules to regulate human behavior. He says: 
 
The nature of man is such that he is born with a fondness for profit. If he indulges this 
fondness, it will lead him into wrangling and strife, and all sense of courtesy and humility 
will disappear. He is born with feelings of envy and hate, and if he indulges these, they 
will lead him into violence and crime, and all sense of loyalty and good faith will 
disappear. Man is born with the desires of the eyes and ears, with a fondness for beautiful 
sights and sounds. If he indulges these, they will lead him into license and wantonness, 
and all ritual principles and correct forms will be lost. Hence, any man who follows his 
nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strife, 









                                                
8 Burton Watson, Xunzi: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 161. In this 
thesis, I mainly use the English translations made by Watson and Knoblock. Sometimes I modify their 
translations.  
9
 Xunzi (荀子), “Xing E Pian” (性惡篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin (王忠林 譯), Xinyi Xunzi Duben (新
譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, p. 395. Henceforth cited simply as 
 9 
 
In this hypothetical situation, since there are no regulations to control people’s 
attempts to satisfy their desires, eventually, the situation becomes chaotic and 
disastrous. This is similar to the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ in which “every man is 
enemy to every man” and life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
10
 When 
people try to satisfy their desires without any constraint, Xunzi claims that human 
nature is bad, e (惡).11 (The issue of human nature in Xunzi’s works is controversial 
and will be discussed later.) To avoid such a predicament, Xunzi advocates that 
fulfillment of human desires has to be regulated by establishing rules. These rules are 
‘li’. This is one of the reasons why people need li. In the chapter entitled “A 
Discussion of Li”, Xunzi explains the origin of ritual: 
 
What is the origin of ritual? I reply: man is born with desires. If his desires are not 
satisfied for him, he cannot but seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy his desires 
                                                                                                                                     
“Xing E Pian.” 
10 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J. C. A Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 84. In 
fact, even though Xunzi and Hobbes share the same starting point of establishing social order and 
rules, they differ in several aspects. Bryan W. Van Norden and David B. Wong argue that Xunzi 
requires a transformation of human desires and emotions, while Hobbes does not. Benjamin I. 
Schwartz notices that Hobbes never concerns himself with the character of the ruler. However, Xunzi 
emphasizes that a ruler has to be morally superior, otherwise comprehensive and detailed laws and 
rules cannot function properly. See, Bryan W. Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human 
Agency,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, eds. T. C. Kline Ⅲ and Philip J. Ivanhoe 
(Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), p. 122. David B. Wong, “Xunzi on 
Moral Motivation,” in Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics, ed. Philip J. 
Ivanhoe (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996), p. 203; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, The 
World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 296. 
11 “Xing E Pian,” p. 395. 
 10 
man observes no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible 
for him not to contend against other men to satisfy his desires. Such contention leads to 
disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The ancient kings hated such disorder, and therefore 
they established ritual principles in order to curb it, to cultivate men’s desires and to 
supply the means for their satisfaction. They saw to it that desires would not overextend 
the means for their satisfaction, and material goods would not be exhausted by the desires. 










In the above passage, it is not only discovered that li is used to prevent social 
disorder and conflict, but also that our desires can be satisfied without being 
frustrated by a lack of resources. Furthermore, when people fulfill their desires, 
goods and material are not exhausted under the regulation of li. Obviously, for Xunzi, 
in the situation where rules of proper conduct or other social constraints are 
established, people can receive great benefits. Avoiding social conflict and satisfying 
the desires of all members of a community account for the importance of li. As for 
the origin of rules of proper conduct, Xunzi suggests that they are created by ancient 
kings. In Xunzi’s writings, ancient kings refer to the sage kings in Chinese history, 
                                                
12
 This passage is modified from both Knoblock and Watson’s translations. See, John Knoblock, 
Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. Vol.Ⅲ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994), p. 55 (henceforth cited as Knoblock); and Burton Watson, Xunzi: Basic Writings (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 93. Henceforth cited as Watson. 
13
 Xunzi (荀子), “Li Lun Pian” (禮論篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin (王忠林 譯), Xinyi Xunzi Duben (新
譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, p. 311. Henceforth: “Li Lun Pian.” 
 11 
for example, Yao (堯), Shun (舜), and Yu (禹). In ancient China, especially in the 
Confucian tradition, these sage kings are regarded as moral sages. In other words, 
Xunzi thinks that li is created by moral sages. For example, he says: “Li is the 
creation of the sages
14
 (禮義者，聖人之所生也).”15 Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that regarding those sages and sage kings as ideal persons whose moral performances 
establish a standard of excellence is better than taking their existence and what they 
did as historical facts. Authenticating the existence of those sages and what they 
really did would in any case be rather difficult. Finally, Xunzi sometimes uses the 
words “sage” and “morally superior person”, junzi (君子), interchangeably in 
discussing the origin of li. For example, in the “The Regulations of a King”, he says: 




2.2.1 The social function of li 
In the discussion of the origin of li, maintaining human lives and an orderly 
society turned out to be one of the main functions of li. Yet there are other functions 
                                                
14
 Knoblock, p. 152. 
15 “Xing E Pian,” p. 396. 
16
 Knoblock revised, p. 103. 
17
 Xunzi (荀子), “Wang Zhi Pian” (王制篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin (王忠林 譯), Xinyi Xunzi Duben 
(新譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, p. 121. Henceforth cited as “Wang 
Zhi Pian.” 
 12 
as well. Since, for Xunzi, by means of li, people can satisfy their desires without 
exhausting resources, li can regulate the distribution of resources, goods and duties 
among the members of a society. In “On Enriching the State” (富國篇), he discusses 
how resources and duties are distributed in accordance with li: 
 
It is the meaning of li that there should be rankings according to nobility or baseness, 
disparities between the privileges of old and young, and modes to match these with 
poverty and wealth, insignificance and importance. Hence, the Son of Heaven, king, wears 
the dragon robes of royal red with its ceremonial cap, the feudal lords wear the black 
dragon robe with its ceremonial cap, the grand officers wear a skirt with an ornamented 
border at the bottom and the appropriate cap, and knights wear a hat of skin with their 
clothes. The de, virtues of the person must match his position; his position must match his 
emolument; his emolument must match his services to the state. From the position of the 
knight up to the supreme position, all must be moderated through li and music. The 
common people … must be controlled by law and norms of behavior. To found states one 
surveys the earth; to support the population one calculates the profits derived from the 
earth; to assign tasks and duties one measures the people’s strength. Employ the people so 
that they are certain to succeed in their assigned tasks; make certain that the profits from 
their assigned tasks are sufficient to provide a means of living for them. In all these to 
cause income to match outgo in regard to clothing, food, and the hundred other necessities 
of life so that with certainty the harvest surplus will be stored up at the proper season is 
called the “art of calculating what fits each respective station.” Thus, from the king down 
to commoners there is no responsibility, however great or small, however frequent or rare, 
that is not derived from this principle. Hence, it is said: “In the royal court none shall 
occupy positions out of mere good fortune, and among the people none shall gain a living 
by mere good fortune.”… If one taxes lightly the cultivated fields and outlying districts, 
imposes excises uniformly at the border stations and in the marketplaces, keeps statistical 
records to reduce the number of merchants and traders, initiates only rarely projects 
 13 
requiring the labor of the people, and does not take the farmers from their fields except in 













In this long paragraph, Xunzi insists on a kind of distribution made in 
accordance with the social status and role of each person. For him, equal distribution 
only leads to the dissatisfaction of each person’s desires and, eventually, social 
disorder. The following is his explanation. 
 
Where the classes of society are equally ranked, there will not be enough goods to go 
around; where power is equally distributed, there will be a lack of unity; where everyone 
is of like status, none would be willing to serve the other. Just as there are Heaven and 
Earth, so too there exists the distinction between superior and inferior, but only when an 
enlightened king appears on the throne can the nation be governed according to regulation. 
Two men of equal eminence cannot govern each other; two men of same low status cannot 
command each other. This is the rule of Heaven. If men are of equal power and station 
and have the same likes and dislikes, then there will not be enough good to supply their 
wants and they will inevitably contend. Contention must lead to disorder, and disorder to 
poverty. The ancient kings abhorred such disorder and therefore they instituted regulations, 
principles of li in order to set up ranks. They established the distinctions between rich and 
                                                
18
 Knoblock revised, pp. 122-3. 
19
 Xunzi (荀子), “Fu Guo Pian.” (富國篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin, (王忠林 譯), Xinyi Xunzi Duben 
(新譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, pp. 141-2. Henceforth: “Fu Guo 
Pian.”   
 14 
poor, eminent and humble, making it possible for those above to join together and watch 











Xunzi thinks that equal distribution fails to satisfy the desires of each person 
because he holds a special view about human desire. Firstly, he thinks that each 
person has some common desires.  
 
All men possess one and the same nature: when hungry, they desire food; when cold, they 
desire to be warm; when exhausted from toil, they desire rest; and they all desire benefit 
and hate harm. Such is the nature that men are born possessing. They do not have to await 
development before they become so. It is the same in the case of a Yu and in that of a Jie. 
The eye distinguishes white from black, the beautiful from the ugly. The ear distinguishes 
sounds and tones as to their shrillness or sonority. The mouth distinguishes the sour and 
salty, the sweet and bitter. The nose distinguishes perfumes and fragrances, rancid and 
fetid odors. The bones, flesh, and skin-lines distinguish hot and cold, pain and itching. 
There, too, are part of the nature that man is born possessing, that he does not have to 






                                                
20 Knoblock revised, p. 96; Watson revised, p. 38. 
21
 “Wang Zhi Pian,” p. 116. 
22






These common desires of people are human basic needs. From the sage king 
like Yu to the tyrant, such as Jie, all people have the same basic needs of having food, 
getting warm, avoiding harm, and so on. Human beings also have some common 
capacities, such as the five senses. Apart from these basic needs, Xunzi thinks that 
human beings have some desires which are more than basic needs. The basic needs 
and desires are components of human nature; but the desires other than these basic 
needs are not inborn and are caused by external stimulation. Everyone wants to 
obtain everything to satisfy his own desires but the materials in the world are too 
scarce to satisfy everyone.
24
 Since Xunzi comments critically that Mozi worries 
“about the problem of the world suffering from the hardship of inadequate 
supplies”
25
 (為天下憂不足)26 as “merely a hardship private to Mozi’s exaggerated 
reckoning”
27
 (私憂過計),28 he is quite optimistic that the basic needs of each person 
                                                
23
 Xunzi (荀子), “Rong Ru Pian” (榮辱篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin (王忠林 譯) Xinyi Xunzi Duben 
(新譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, p. 42. Henceforth cited as “Ron Ru 
Pian.” 
24
 In “On Enriching the State”, Xunzi says: “All people desire and dislike the same things, but since 
desires are many and the things that satisfy them relatively few, this scarcity will necessarily lead to 
conflict (欲惡同物，欲多而物寡，寡則必爭矣。).”; Knoblock, p. 121; “Fu Guo Pian,” p. 140.   
25
 Knoblock, p. 127. 
26 “Fu Guo Pian,” p. 144. 
27
 Knoblock, p. 127. 
28




 However, he also notices that all people hardly satisfy their 
non-basic desires because of the scarcity of goods and that this causes contention and 
disorder. For Xunzi, under equal distribution, each person obtains the same quantity 
of resources to satisfy all of his basic and non-basic desires. Although it can help 
people to satisfy their basic needs, social disorder cannot be eliminated because 
people probably fail to fulfill their non-basic desires by equal distribution. Thus, he 
objects to equal distribution and emphasizes the necessity of social hierarchy.  
 
To be as honored as the king and to be as wealthy by possessing the whole world-this 
natural human desire is shared by all men alike. But if all men gave free rein to their 
desires, the result would be impossible to endure, and the material goods of the whole 
world would be inadequate to satisfy them. Accordingly, the Ancient Kings acted to 
control them with ritual principles in order thereby to divide society into classes, creating 
therewith differences in status between the noble and base, disparities between the 
privileges of age and youth, and the division of the wise from the stupid, the able from the 
incapable. All of this caused men to perform the duties of their station in life and each to 
receive his due; only after this had been done was the amount and substance of the 
emolument paid by grain made to fit their respective stations. This indeed is the way to 
make the whole populace live together in harmony and unity. Accordingly, when a 
humane man occupies the highest position, farmers labor with all their energy to exhaust 
the potential of their fields, merchants scrutinize with keen eyes to get the utmost from 
their goods, the various artisans use their skills to the fullest in making utensils and wares, 
and the officials, from the knights and grand officers up to the feudal lords, all execute 
fully the functions of their offices with humanity, generosity, wisdom, and ability. This 
                                                
29 I think for Professor Fung Yiu-ming for pointing out the distinction between desires as basic needs 
and desires that are more than basic needs, and for his discussion of Xunzi’s optimistic view of 
satisfying human basic needs. 
 17 
may be called “perfect peace.” So though one may have as his emolument the whole 
world, he need not consider it excessive, and though one be only a gatekeeper, receptionist, 
guard, or nightwatchman, he need never think his salary too meager. Anciently it was said: 
“Unequal yet equivalent, bent yet obedient, not the same yet uniform.” This refers to the 













To some extent whether equal distribution sacrifices the satisfaction of 
someone’s basic needs can only be determined in highly qualified social and 
economic conditions. Any simple response to this issue is inappropriate. Since the 
main theme of this thesis is Xunzi’s moral knowledge and the problem about equal 
distribution is more closely related to Xunzi’s political philosophy than his moral 
philosophy, this problem need not be discussed here in detail. On the other hand, 
even if we find a special pattern of equal distribution which does not bring about any 
abovementioned bad consequences, it does not weaken the significance of li in 
Xunzi’s philosophy because it can fulfill other important functions. Reverting to our 
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topic, from the above quoted passage, it becomes clear that how li fulfills its 
distributive function. Firstly, the members of a society are classified into different 
social classes in accordance with li. The standards of classification in li include, at 
least, the age, the abilities and moral performance of a person. Secondly, li also 
prescribes what and how many resources and duties are given to the persons in 
different social classes.  
Although Xunzi emphasizes the necessity of hierarchical social structure, this 
does not mean that he does not allow people to alter their own social status. In some 
passages, it can be seen that Xunzi seems to advocate meritocracy. He requires that 
“those without ability shall be without office”
32
 (無能不官)33 and “[t]he worthy 
shall be honored, the able employed, and each shall be assigned to his appropriate 
position without oversight”
34
 (尚賢使能，而等位不遺).35  He thinks that the 
operation of a meritocratic society should be as follows: 
 
In the case of worthy and able men, promote them without waiting for their turn to come 
up. In the case of inferior and incompetent men, dismiss them without 
hesitation…Although a man may be the descendant of kings, dukes, or high court 
ministers, if he cannot adhere to ritual principles, he should be ranked among the 
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commoners. Although a man may be the descendant of commoners, if he has acquired 
learning, is upright in conduct, and can adhere to li, he should be promoted to the post of 
prime minister or high court official. When it comes to men of perverse words and 
theories, perverse undertakings and talents, or to people who are slippery or vagrant, they 
should be given tasks to do, taught what is right, and allowed a period of trial. Encourage 
them when rewards, discipline them with punishments, and if they settle down to their 
work, then look after them as subjects; but if not, cast them out. In the case of those who 
belong to the five incapacitated groups, (those who are dumb, deaf, crippled, missing an 
arm or leg, or dwarfed.) the government should gather them together, look after them, and 
give them whatever work they are able to do. Employ them, provide them with food and 
clothing, and take care to see that none are left out. If anyone is found acting or using his 
talents to work against the good of the time, condemn him to death without mercy. This is 
what is called the virtue of Heaven and the government of a true king.
36










Perhaps Xunzi’s political thought is compatible with equality of opportunity. 
This claim may be supported further because someone argues that the Pre-Qin 
thinkers may hold that all men are naturally equal.
38
 However, whether Xunzi’s 
political thought is compatible with equality of opportunity is a topic for another 
essay. Therefore, this issue is not discussed here.  
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Someone may argue that it is more effective to solve the conflict among people 
by eliminating their desires instead of establishing a complex social hierarchy and 
practice of li. Xunzi thinks, however, that this suggestion is untenable. Obviously, 
some very basic needs of human beings are impossible to eliminate without causing 
the death of people. People can neither eliminate nor satisfy all their desires. But they 
can be moderated. 
 
The basic nature of man is that which he receives from Heaven. The emotions are the 
substance of the nature and the desires are the responses of the emotions. When what is 
desired is judged to be obtainable, it will be pursued. That is a necessary and inescapable 
part of our essential nature. When one has judged that his desires can be satisfied, it must 
then be the function of the intellect to guide the search for satisfaction. Even a lowly 
gatekeeper cannot keep from having desires, for they are the inseparable attributes of the 
basic nature. On the other hand, even the king cannot completely satisfy all his desires. 
But although one cannot completely satisfy all his desires, he can come close complete 
satisfaction, and although one cannot do away with all desires, he can moderate the search 
for satisfaction. That is to say, one cannot completely satisfy all his desires, but by seeking 
to do so he can come close to satisfying them. Conversely, one cannot rid himself of 
desire, and there will always be longings left unsatisfied; but one who ponders the matter 
can make an attempt to moderate the search for satisfaction. The Dao in its positive aspect 
can lead one close to the satisfaction of all desires and in its negative aspect can serve to 
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Xunzi believes that the moderation of human desires not only can eliminate 
conflicts among people, but also that everyone can satisfy his or her desires and the 





Moderate the use of goods, let the people make a generous living, and be good at storing 
up the harvest surplus. Moderate the use of goods by means of ritual principles, and let the 
people make a generous living through the exercise of government. 
Such moderation in the use of goods will cause overflowing surpluses and allow the 
people to make a generous living. If the people are allowed to make a generous living, 
they will become rich. If the people are rich, their fields will be fat because they are well 
cultivated. If the fields are fat and well cultivated, they will bear a harvest a hundred times 
over. When the upper classes take from the harvest as provided by law and the lower 
classes moderate their use of goods according to ritual principles, the surplus will pile up 
to veritable mounds and hills so that it will seem on occasion that it must be burned to 
destroy what there is no more room to store. How could a gentleman face the calamity of 
having no surplus? 
 
Accordingly, if one knows to be moderate in the use of goods and to allow the people a 
generous living, he is certain to have a reputation for being humane, just, sage-like, and 
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virtuous; moreover he will have an accumulation of riches as substantial as a mound or 
hill. This is due to no other cause than its being the natural product of moderation in the 
use of goods and allowing the people a generous living. If one does not know to be 
moderate in the use of goods and to allow the people a generous living, then the people 
will be poor. If the people are poor, the fields will produce meagerly and be overgrown 
with weeds. If the fields produce meagerly and have become overgrown with weeds, they 
will bear less than half the normal harvest. The upper classes, though fond of plundering 
and stealing the people’s rightful goods, will find only meager quantities to take. If others 
act contrary to ritual requirements to moderate their use of goods, then they are sure to 
have a reputation for confiscating property out of utter avarice, and for all that they will 













The moderation of desire is achieved through the practice of li. However, 
moderation cannot be merely identified with curbing human desires. Xunzi holds that, 
on the one hand, the mere constraint or elimination of human desires cannot prevent 
social disorder. On the other hand, altering human desires by appropriate cultivation 
is an effective and long-lasting way to avoid social conflicts. And it is the practice of 
li that can transform human desires. 
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Thus, the meaning of li is to nurture. The meat of pastured and grain-fed animals, rice and 
millet, blends and combinations of the five flavors, are what nurture the mouth. The 
fragrances of peppercorns and orchids, aromas and bouquets, are what nurture the nose. 
Carved and polished [jade], incised and inlaid [metals], and [fabrics] embroidered with the 
white and black axe emblem, the azure and black notched-stripe, the azure and crimson 
stripe, the white and chime-stone, are what nurture the eye. Bells and drums, flutes and 
crimson-blazon, lutes and zithers, reed pipes and reed organs, are what nurture the ear. 
Spacious rooms, secluded chambers, mats of plaited rushes, couches and bed mats, 
armrests and cushions, are what nurture the body. Thus, li is what nurture.
44







Through the practice of li, one can transform his or her desires by cultivating 
new desires to override the existing ones. Moreover, these cultivated desires become 
the main motivation of human actions. In other words, li has the function of 
transforming human desires. 
 
2.2.2 The function of li: Transformation 
Following the transformative function of li, people in different social roles and 
classes are cultivated to desire things which correspond to and are appropriate to 
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their status. Xunzi illustrates this by suggesting what things a king should desire and 
explaining why he should desire them. 
 
When the morally superior person, junzi, has been nurtured by these things, he will also 
fond of distinctions. What is meant by “distinctions”? I say that these refer to the 
gradations of rank according to nobility or baseness, disparities between the privileges of 
old and young, and modes of identification to match these with poverty or wealth, 
insignificance or importance. Thus, the king has the Great Chariot and rush mats to care 
for his comfort. On either side of the chariot fragrant marsh angelica is placed to care for 
his sense of smell. In front of him there is the inlaid yoke shaft to nurture his sense of 
sight. There are the harmonious sounds of the tinkling bells on the horse’s trappings; the 
chariot moves along in time with the “Martial” and “Imitation” music; and the horses 
gallop in time with the “Succession” and “Guarding” music- all in order to nurture his 
sense of hearing. There is the dragon banner with nine scallops to nurture a sense of 
sacredness about him. There are the recumbent rhinoceros, the crouching tiger, back 
harnesses with scaly dragon patterns, the silken carriage coverings, and yoke-ends with 
dragons to nurture his majestic authority. Thus, the horse for the Grand Chariot must be 
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The king is cultivated to desire luxuries because doing so can distinguish him 
from others. This distinction can nurture a respect for authority. This can help the 
king to govern. Thus, what one is cultivated to desire should be appropriate to one’s 
social status and should help people fulfill their social functions. Moreover, li is also 
used to control our passions and emotions. Extreme emotions of joy or grief need in 





Rites trim what is too long, stretch out what is too short, eliminate excess, remedy 
deficiency, and extend cultivated forms that express love and respect so that they increase 
and complete the beauty of conduct according to one’s duty. Thus, elegant adornment and 
gross ugliness, the sounds of music and the sobs of crying, contented happiness and 
grief-stricken distress are all opposites, yet rites use them all, substituting and changing 
them as the occasion requires. 
 
Elegant adornment, music, and happiness are what sustain tranquillity and serve 
auspicious occasions. Gross ugliness, weeping, and sorrow are what sustain anxiety and 
serve inauspicious occasions. Hence, their utilization of elegant adornment does not go so 
far as to be sensuous or seductive, nor gross ugliness so far as to produce emaciation or 
self-neglect. Their use of music and happiness does not go so far as to be wayward and 
abandoned or indolent and rude, nor do weeping and sorrow go so far as to produce 
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However, the question that emerges here is that of understanding how human 
desires can be transformed through the practice of li.  
 
2.2.3 xing 
The answer to the question of how the practice of li transforms human desires is 
related to Xunzi’s conception of human nature, or xing (性). Although Xunzi himself 
says that human nature is bad, or e (惡), he never thinks that human beings have any 
innate tendency to enjoy damaging, destroying, or hurting each other.
51
 To clarify 
what he means in saying that human nature is bad, we must look to what he has to 
say about human nature. He says: “What characterizes a man from birth is called his 
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 (生之所以然者謂之性).” It is the definition of xing. As for its content, he 
says:  
 
To desire food when hungry, to desire warmth when cold, to desire rest when tired, and to 
be fond of what is beneficial and to hate what is harmful—these characteristics man is 
born possessing, and he does not have to wait to develop them. They are identical in the 







Actually, Xunzi thinks that human nature at least consists in human inborn basic 
instincts and desires. It is implausible to say that these instincts and desires are evil. 
Thus, it is reasonable to believe that when Xunzi says human nature is bad, he does 
not mean that human innate desires are intrinsically bad or evil.
55
 In section 2.2.1, 
some of Xunzi’s words were cited to show that when he says human nature is evil, 
this could simply mean that bad consequences are caused by human beings when 
they pursue the satisfaction of desires in an uncontrolled manner. It is more 
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reasonable to think that human nature is neutral in Xunzi’s philosophy.
56
 Perhaps he 
says human nature is bad because he wants to emphasize that, under some conditions, 
such as the scarcity of resources, the combination of human desires would give rise 
to bad consequences. 
Furthermore, Xunzi’s conception of xing also includes some basic human 
emotions. 
 
Love and hate, delight and anger, sorrow and joy, are stored within—these are described 








For Xunzi, human nature consists of basic instincts, inborn appetitive and 
sensory desires, and inborn abilities of responding to external stimulation.
59
 This 
explains why he usually uses people’s abilities to receive and respond to sensory 
                                                
56 Wu Rujun (吳汝鈞), Rujia Zhexue (儒家哲學) Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan (臺北市：臺
灣商務印書館), 1995, p. 56. And Cai Renhou (蔡仁厚), Kong Meng Xun Zhexue (孔孟荀哲學) 
Taibei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju (臺北市：臺灣學生書局), 1984, p. 387. 
57
 Knoblock, p. 16.  
58 Xunzi (荀子), “Tian Lun Pian” (天論篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin (王忠林 譯), Xinyi Xunzi Duben 
(新譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, p. 275. Henceforth: “Tian Lun 
Pian.” 
59 Xu Fuquan (徐復觀) also holds that the Xunzi’s conception of human nature consists of human 
basic desires, such as desiring food when one feels hunger, and the abilities of human sensory organs, 
for instance, eyes for seeing. Furthermore, Xu claims that human nature is quite plastic in Xunzi’s 
philosophy. Under this understanding of Xunzi’s theory of human nature, it is more plausible to say 
that human nature is neutral in Xunzi’s thought because human basic desires are neither good nor evil. 
See, Xu Fuquan (徐復觀), Zhongguo Ren Xing Lun Shi: Xian Qin Pian (中國人性論史：先秦篇) 
Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Shudian (上海：上海三聨書店), 2001, pp. 201, 206.    
 29 
stimuli to illustrate his concept of human nature. This kind of inborn ability is 
well-developed after birth. Thus, Xunzi claims that human nature cannot be further 





Being contrary to xing, wei (偽),62 or constitutive effort, refers to the things 
which can be acquired by learning or by human effort. One example of constitutive 
effort is li. In fact, li is created by the sage. He says: 
 
As a general rule, “inborn nature” embraces what is spontaneous from Nature, what 
cannot be learned, and what required no application to master. Ritual principles are 
creations of the sages. They are things that people must study to be able to follow them 
and to which they must apply themselves before they can fulfill their precepts. What 
cannot be gained by learning and cannot be mastered by application yet is found in man is 
properly termed “inborn nature.” What must be learned before a man can do it and what 
he must apply himself to before he can master it yet is found in man is properly called 
“constitutive effort.” This is precisely the distinction between “inborn nature” and 
“constitutive effort. 
 
Now, it belongs to the inborn nature of man that the eye is able to see and the ear to hear. 
The ability to see clearly cannot be separated from the eye, nor the ability to hear acutely 
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How does the sage create li through constitutive effort? Xunzi answers that  
 
The sage accumulates his thoughts and ideas. He masters through practice the skills of his 
constitutive effort and the principles involved therein in order to produce ritual principles 
and to develop laws and standards. This being the case, ritual principles, laws and 
standards, are the creation of the constitutive effort of the sage and not the product of 









Through deliberation, lü (慮) and cumulative effort, ji (積), the sage is able to 
establish li.
67
 These two factors also constitute the conception of constitutive effort. 
However, it is still unclear how wei operates. Xunzi further explains: 
 
What characterizes a man from birth is called his “nature”’ What is produced out of the 
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harmony of inborn nature, out of the sensibilities of the organ tallying as the sense 
respond to stimuli, and what from birth is effortless and spontaneous are called “nature.” 
The feelings of liking and disliking, of delight and anger, and of sorrow and joy that are 
inborn in our nature are called “emotions.” The emotions being so paired, the mind’s 
choosing between them is called “thinking.” The mind’s thinking something and the 
natural abilities’ acting on it is called “constitutive effort.” When thoughts are 
accumulated and one’s natural abilities have been practiced so that something is 
completed, it is called “constitutive effort... The capacity of knowing which is within man 
is called “knowing.” What man’s knowing is corresponding with the facts is called 
“knowing.” The capacity of being able that is within man is called “capacity”. Capacity 











In the above passage, we can discover two senses of constitutive effort.  
The first sense of wei refers to the capacity of the heart-mind, xin (心), to 
respond to external stimuli. The second sense of wei refers to a learned ability. After 
numerous exercises of deliberation and adjudication and participating in learning and 
in the practice of li, one develops some virtues and habits of acting morally. This is 
the second sense of wei.
70
 However, in describing the first sense of wei, Xunzi seems 
to imply that the function of heart-mind to respond external stimuli is a part of 
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 If that is true, Xunzi’s concept of xing is not sharply distinct 
from his concept of wei since the first sense of wei is one of the components of 
human nature. Some evidence can be found in Xunzi’s works to support it. Firstly, in 
the above cited passage, there are also two senses of “knowing” and “capacity”. The 
first sense of these two terms refers to our natural capacities, while the second sense 
is about the actualization of these capacities or the performance issued from these 
actualized capacities. Xunzi emphasizes that the first sense of “knowing” and 
“capacity” is human natural capacity by claiming that these two capacities are 
“within man” (在人者).72 From the whole cited passage, the term “wei” is parallel to 
“knowing” and “capacity” and all of them have two senses. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to believe that the first sense of “wei” is as same as the first sense of 
“knowing” and “capacity” and they are all the components of human nature. 
Furthermore, he explicitly states that these capacities and the basic human 
dispositions are common in people in “Of Honor and Disgrace” (榮辱篇). 
 
In natural talent, inborn nature, knowing, and capacity, the morally superior man and the 
petty man are the same. In cherishing honor and detesting disgrace, in loving benefit and 
                                                
71 I thank for Prof Fung Yiu-ming for informing me that the first sense of wei is part of human inborn 
nature. 
72
 See footnotes 68 and 69. 
 33 






Thus, these capacities and basic human dispositions are the components of human 
nature. Secondly, in Xunzi’s text it can be discovered that the term “xing” not merely 
refers to human basic needs or natural dispositions and instincts. For example, in 
“Dispelling Blindness” (解蔽篇), he says that, “man is born with capacity of 
knowing…the heart-mind is born with the capacity of knowing
75
 (人生而有知……
心生而有知).”76 Thus, xing not only includes human basic needs, dispositions and 
instincts, but also consists of some inborn capacities.  
In short, the distinction between xing and wei is obscure. Although xing is “a 
biological concept in that it refers to what all human beings are born with,” it does 
not merely include human basic sensory and appetitive desires.
77
 Some capacities 
which can be developed by human effort are also held to be constituents of human 
nature. Wei is not only what is caused by continuous learning and practice. It also 
                                                
73
 Knoblock revised, p. 190.  
74
 “Rong Ru Pian,” p. 41. 
75 Watson revised, pp. 131-2.  
76 Xunzi (荀子), “Jie Bi Pian” (解蔽篇), trans. Wang Zhonglin (王忠林 譯), Xinyi Xunzi Duben (新
譯荀子讀本) Taibei: Sanmin Shuju (臺北市：三民書局), 2006, p. 354.  
77
 Chong Kim-chong, “Xunzi and the Essentialist Mode of Thinking on Human Nature,” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy, 35:1 (2008): 71.    
 34 
refers to the human inborn capacity to respond to external stimuli. Thus, wei, as a 
human capacity, is part of xing. To avoid confusion, in this thesis xing only refers to 
basic human needs and instincts. Other human, non-well-developed inborn capacities 
are named qing (情). This notion is crucial to our understanding of the account of the 
transformation of human desires through the practice of li. It will be discussed in the 
next section.    
 
2.2.5 Transformation of xing 
Before discussing how xing can be transformed through the practice of li, let us 
read another account of why moral rules are created: 
 
In antiquity the sage kings took man’s nature to be evil, to be inclined to prejudice and 
prone to error, to be perverse and rebellious, and not to be upright or orderly. For this 
reason they invented ritual principles and precepts of moral duty. They instituted the 
regulations that are contained in laws and standards. Through these actions they intended 
to “straighten out” and develop man’s sensory and emotional nature and to set it aright. 
They sought to tame and transform his sensory and emotional nature and to guide it with 
the Way. They caused both his sensory and emotional nature to develop with good order 
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It becomes clear that li is created for regulating our sensory and emotional 
nature. For Xunzi, human inborn nature has to be controlled, since otherwise it can 
cause bad consequences. Now, the problem is whether sensory and emotional nature 
can be transformed. Xunzi believes that it can be altered. He says, 
 









Inborn nature is the root and beginning, the raw material and original constitution. 
Constitutive effort is responsible for what is adorned, ordered, developed, and flourishing. 
If there were no inborn nature, there would be nothing for constitutive effort to improve; if 
there were no constitutive effort, then inborn nature could not refine itself. Only when 
inborn nature and constitutive effort combine does a true sage emerge and perform the 
task of unifying the world.
82 
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These two quoted passages explicitly indicate that human xing not only can be 
transformed, but also is necessary for realizing any constitutive effort. However, in 
section, 2.2.4, we noted that xing is inborn and well-developed. People cannot 
develop it further. For example, we must desire food when we feel hungry. It is 
unintelligible to propose that we must nurture or develop an ability to desire food 
when we are hungry: is that not what it means to be hungry in the first place? Xunzi 
seems to make incompatible claims about the nature of xing and the object of wei.  
This apparent contradiction can be explained in the following way. Firstly, even 
though we cannot alter these inborn sensory and appetitive desires and basic 
emotions, they can be satisfied in a cultured, or elegant way. This is what Cua calls 
the ennobling function of li.
84
 In this sense, wei refers to the cultivated desires for 
satisfying those inborn desires and the desires to express the primitive emotions in a 
refined way. Secondly, the ennobling function can be successful because there are 
some other inborn wants and capacities which go beyond those basic sensory and 
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appetitive desires and feelings for refinement.
85
 Xunzi names these capacities and 
wants qing (情). It should be noted that in some contexts, qing refers to emotions or 
feelings. We will discuss some of these capacities and wants later.  
If there exist such capacities and wants, it might be possible that human beings 
also want what is good, and more specifically, what is morally good. Graham thinks 





Every man who desires to do good does so precisely because his nature is evil. A man 
whose accomplishments are meager longs for greatness; an ugly man longs for beauty; a 
man in cramped quarters longs for spaciousness; a poor man longs for wealth; a humble 
man longs for eminence. Whatever a man lacks in himself he will seek outside. But if a 
man is already rich, he will not long for wealth, and if he is already eminent, he will not 
long for greater power. What a man already possesses in himself he will not bother to look 
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In the above passage we have evidence to support the claim that although Xunzi 
holds that human nature is self-interested, it is still possible that people act morally 
and delight in performing morally good actions. David B. Wong suggests that, in this 
passage Xunzi tries to show that human beings with their original self-interested, or 
morally neutral nature, could transform into moral beings by pursuing what they 
lack.
89
 Thus, human nature can be transformed by li through other human inborn 
capacities and wants.  
 
2.2.6 The distinction between ke and neng 
Human capacities and wants seem to provide the way not only for transforming 
xing, but also means for people to become sages. Xunzi believes that it is possible for 
anyone to be a sage. By continuously learning the rationale of li and morality and 
participating in the practice of li, we can cultivate the sense of morality.
90
 As Xunzi 
says: 
 
I say that in general what made the sage king Yu a Yu was the fact that he practiced 
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benevolence and righteousness and abided by the proper rules and standards. Since this is 
so, then benevolence, righteousness, and proper rules and standards must be based upon 
rational principles which we can know and which we are capable of putting into practice. 
That being so, it is clear that any ordinary man can become a Yu, since every man has the 
essential faculties needed to understand the substance of benevolence, righteousness, the 
proper rules and standards and the potential ability to put them into practice. Therefore it 









Although Xunzi claims that it is possible for anyone to be a sage because we 
can know and act in accordance with moral sense, in fact, not all people actually are 
sages. To defend his claim, he draws a distinction between “capacity”, or ke (可), and 
“ability”, or neng (能).93 
 
Someone asks: “How is it possible for the sage to reach this high state through his 
accumulated effort, but the rest of mankind cannot?” I say that although it is possible for 
them to do so, they cannot be induced to do so. Thus, although the petty man is capable of 
becoming a morally superior man, he is unwilling to do so; although the morally superior 
person could become a petty man, he is unwilling to do so. It has never been impossible 
for the petty man and the morally superior person to become other. The fact they have 
never done so, although it is possible for them to do so, is because they cannot be induced 
to do so. Thus, although it is true that it is possible for the ordinary man to become a Yu, 
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that the ordinary man has the real capacity to become a Yu is not necessarily so. Even 
though one is unable to become a Yu, this does not contradict the possibility of his 
becoming a Yu. 
 
It is possible for a man to travel by foot across the width of the whole world, yet there has 
never been a case where anyone was able to travel across the world by foot. So, too, 
although it has never been impossible for the artisan, carpenter, farmer, of trader to 
practice each other’s business, they have never been able to do so. If we consider the 
implications of these facts, we see that something’s being possible does not guarantee 
having the ability to do it. Even though one is unable to do something, this does not 
contradict the possibility of doing it. This being the case, that something is possible or 
impossible is entirely dissimilar from having or not having the ability to do it. It is evident 












For Xunzi, people not only have the capacity to acquire knowledge of morality 
and ritual, but they also have the capacity to participate in moral and ritual practice. 
In other words, everyone can be a sage in the sense that everyone has these capacities. 
However, these capacities are not well-developed already. Without developing them, 
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one cannot cultivate a sense of morality and cannot be a sage. There are several 
factors, such as a depraved environment, lack of guidance and influence of teachers 
and friends having morally good characters, that can prevent one from developing 
these capacities. Moreover, Xunzi realizes that people may have no will to nurture 
their capacities and admits that in some cases the capacity is inadequate to the 
development of some virtues.
96
 However, being unable to develop virtues or unable 
to be a sage does not imply that one has no corresponding capacities. For Xunzi, 
“capacity” and “ability” are different things.
97
 Finally, these capacities are not moral 
capacities. Since Xunzi denies that human beings has some inborn organic moral 
structure which is the source of our moral sense and moral motivation, these 
capacities do not have any substantive moral content. In the following section, I will 
focus on the capacities related to human emotion.  
 
2.2.7 li and emotion 
At the beginning of the section 2.2.3, it was mentioned that li can cultivate 
human desires and emotions. In this section, how li transforms human emotions will 
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be discussed. Xunzi thinks that human beings have some emotions which go beyond 
their inborn nature. One of them is the love of its own kind. He says: “nothing that 
possesses consciousness fails to love its own kind…since no creature has greater 





Following these emotions of remembrance and longing for the dead, Xunzi 
explains why the mourning period for the death of a parent is three years. During the 
first three years after the death of parents, he thinks, people’s “pain of grief is most 
intense”
100
 (所以為至痛極也). 101  The emotion of grief has to be expressed, 
otherwise one’s emotions of remembrance and longing for the dead will be frustrated 
and unfulfilled.
102
 Actually, sacrificial rite is created for expressing our emotions of 
remembrance and longing for the dead
103
 (祭者，志意思慕之情也).104 Through rite, 
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In addition to the abovementioned emotions, human beings have other profound 
feelings: 
 
Ritual has three roots. Heaven and Earth are the root of life. Forebears are the root of 
kinship. Lords and teachers are the root of order. Were there no Heaven and no Earth, how 
could there be life? Were there no forebears, how could there be issue? Were there no 
lords and no teachers, how could there be order? Were even one of these three lost, there 
would be no peace and security for man. Thus, rituals serve Heaven above and Earth 









Ji tian (祭天), sacrificial ceremony of Heaven, and ji zu (祭祖), sacrificial 
ceremony for the ancestors, are not used for influencing any supernatural power to 
protect or to help people. According to Xunzi, the aim of performing these 
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ceremonies is to appreciate the works of nature and our ancestors. Nature produces 
things for our use. We and our ancestors are produced by nature too. Our life is given 
to us by our ancestors. Lords and teachers establish the rules to govern and maintain 
the society in which we live. Thus, the sacrificial ceremony in the honor of Heaven 
and the ancestors can develop people’s sense of appreciation and reciprocity and 
provide an appropriate way to express these feelings. In other words, one of the key 
functions of ritual is to provide an appropriate way to express people’s yearning, 
appreciation and reciprocity. Xunzi thinks that virtue can be developed through the 
cultivation of the sense of reverence and reciprocity in the sacrificial ceremony in the 




Through the practice of li, Xunzi thinks, the individual characteristics of people 
can be molded. This process includes cultivation and refinement. Transformation 
through the practice of li finally aims at the balance between the expression of 
emotion and ritual form.  
 
All rites begin coarseness, are brought to fulfillment with form, and end with pleasure and 
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beauty. Rites reach their highest perfection when both emotion and form are fully realized. 
In rites of the next order, emotions and form in turn prevail. In the lowest order of rites, all 







One who always strikes the balance between ritual form and emotion is a sage. 
The maintenance of the balance between form and emotion is a complex issue. 
Whether a form of expression is appropriate depends on the occasion, on practical 
considerations, and on aesthetic needs.
113
 In other words, the realization of the 
balance of form and emotion requires one to consider all relevant factors. This is the 
characteristic of the sage. This point will be further discussed later.   
In short, the above emotions and feelings, for instance, the love of one’s own 
kind, remembrance and longing for the dead parent, a sense of reverence and 
reciprocity, are the raw materials in human nature which li can work upon in order to 
shape human beings to love virtue and to feel delight in participating in the practice 
of li.
114
 A balance between emotion and ritual form is the ideal form of li. Its 
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realization requires that people put a lot of effort into the practice li and do so for a 
long time.  
Before going on to the next section, let us summarize the discussion of Xunzi’s 
conception of li. The delimiting function of li prevents social disorder by means of 
limiting the individual pursuit of self-interest.
115
 This is, however, not the only 
function of ritual. It also provides “conditions or opportunities for satisfaction of 
desires within the prescribed limits of action.”
116
 This supportive function of ritual is 
performed by redirecting the course of individual self-serving activities.
117
 After this 
redirection, our desires can be satisfied without being suppressed by the scarcity of 
resources.  
Finally, li can refine our ways of satisfying desires. For example, a desire for 
food is natural, but the manner of satisfying this desire could be elegant when we 
satisfy it in the form of li. To some extent, li transforms our desires. After the 
transformation, what we desire is not merely the satisfaction of basic needs, but an 
elegant way of satisfying them.
118
 If li contains some moral considerations, 
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following it can transform our feelings and desires and lead to the development of 
virtues. In Xunzi’s moral philosophy, the establishment of li is based on several 
moral considerations: the importance of maintaining social order, developing one’s 
sense of righteousness and benevolence, and providing a way to achieve the 
Confucian ultimate goal of life: being a sage. Thus, through the ennobling function 
of li, a person can transform his or her desires and emotions and develop the virtues 
which are essential for being a sage.
119
   
 
2.2.8 Xue  
In this section, learning, or xue (學) will be discussed. Learning is essential to 
the moral transformation. The following passage shows the content and purpose of 
learning:  
 
Where should learning begin and where should it end? I say: Its proper method is to start 
with the recitation of the Classics and end with the reading of the ritual texts. Its real 
purpose is first to learn to be a scholar and in the end to learn to be a sage. … Truly The 
Book of Documents contain the record of governmental affairs. The Odes set the correct 
standards to which pronunciations should adhere. The Rituals contain the model for the 
primary social distinctions and the categories used by analogical extension for the guiding 
rules and ordering norms of behavior. Accordingly, when learning has been perfected in 





the rituals, it has come to its terminus. Surely this may be called the culmination of the 
Dao and its Power. The reverence and refinement of The Rituals, the concord and 
harmony of The Music, the breadth of The Odes and The Documents, the subtlety of The 











What Xunzi asks people to learn is the traditional classics of Confucianism. Li 
is learnt in the end. Being a sage is the ultimate goal of learning. Through learning, 
one knows the content, requirement and standard of li, and the truth of morality. 
After knowing the truth of morality, one can act in accordance with the ritual and 
moral rules and is able to participate in the practice of li. One’s desires and emotions 
also can be transformed by cumulative hard work. Those who achieve the ultimate 
goal of learning completely transform their desires and they only desire what is 
recommended and required by the teachings of the sage.  
 
The morally superior person, knowing well that learning that is incomplete and impure 
does not deserve to be called fine, recites and enumerates his studies that he will be 
familiar with them, ponders over them and searches into them that he will fully penetrate 
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their meaning, acts in his person that they will come to dwell within him, and eliminates 
what is harmful within him that he will hold on to them and be nourished by them. 
Thereby he causes his eye to be unwilling to see what is contrary to it, his ear unwilling to 
hear what is contrary to it, his mouth unwilling to speak anything contrary to it, and his 
mind unwilling to contemplate anything contrary to it. When he has reached the limit of 
such perfection, he finds delight in it. His eye then finds greater enjoyment in the five 
colors, his ear in the five sounds, his mouth in the five tastes, and his mind benefits from 
possessing all that is in the world. When he has reached this stage, power or the personal 
profit cannot influence him, masses cannot sway him, and the whole world cannot deter 













In short, learning is just a part of the transformation of human desires. 
Immersing oneself in the practice of ritual is not only necessary for a complete 
transformation, but can also cultivate one’s personal character. After the 
transformation, one can express emotions in an appropriate way. This appropriate 
expression constitutes one’s virtue. Junzi (君子), the ethically superior person and 
the ethical ideal advocated by Confucianism, is the person who is virtuous and can 
express his or her emotions and feelings elegantly. Thus, ritual can exalt a person to 
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be an ethically paradigmatic individual. This ennobling function of ritual is a 
distinctive feature of Confucian ethics and traditional Chinese culture.
124
 Obviously, 
the consideration of self-cultivation and self-exaltation is beyond the narrow prudent 
consideration of the benefits and losses brought by personal actions and choices.  
Finally, the whole discussion can be summarized by introducing Xunzi’s 
conceptions of good and badness. Order has positive value in Xunzi’s thought. Thus, 
it is good to establish order in society and within oneself. Xunzi does not think that 
eliminating human desires can bring order to people and societies. Only through 
controlling one’s desires and emotions and the ways of satisfying and expressing 
them can one establish order within oneself. Social order can also be established 
more easily and can be long-lasting when each person can control his or her desires 
and emotions well. It is good that people’s desires can be satisfied without 
exhausting goods and producing social conflicts. Li can achieve this. As for badness, 
for Xunzi, disorder must be bad. Furthermore, any condition in which people cannot 
satisfy their desires or the satisfaction of desires causing any disorder is bad too. 
Using Xunzi’s own words, good is “upright, reasonable, and orderly”, and bad is 
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Although Xunzi’s conception of li and the some related issues have been 
discussed, more needs to be said about the nature and character of the creator of li. 
That is the sage, or junzi.   
 
2.3 The significance of the sage and junzi  
The sage and morally superior person, junzi, is important in Xunzi’s moral 
philosophy. In the previous sections, it has been revealed that the sage creates li to 
maintain social order and to produce conditions for satisfying people’s desires 
without causing disorder. Although the sage creates social rules and li, this does not 
mean that he or she is unimportant in a society with well-developed rules and laws. 
Xunzi thinks that even the existence of a good law may not ensure social harmony.  
 
It is possible to have good laws and still have disorder in the state. But to have a morally 
superior person acting as ruler and disorder in the state- from ancient times to the present I 
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He explains why the morally superior person is more important than law: 
 
Thus, the law cannot be established alone, nor can its categories for analogical extension 
apply themselves in particular instances. If proper men are obtained, then the law will 
survive; if such men are lost, then it will perish. The law is the first manifestation of order; 
the morally superior person is the wellspring of the law. Accordingly, if there is a morally 
superior person, however incomplete the law may be, it is sufficient to be employed 
everywhere. So too if there is no morally superior person, then however complete the law 
may be, the loss of the proper application of the proper sequence of ‘first and last’ and the 










Xunzi focuses on the application of law and claims that the morally superior 
person is necessary for a society. The sage and junzi, as the creator of laws and li, 
clearly understand the purpose of every particular rule. They also can consider all the 
relevant factors in applying rules. Thus, negatively, they do not misuse rules. 
Positively, they can appropriately apply rules to judge or guide people’s behavior. It 
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other words, the sage and junzi can appropriately respond to the changing 
environment in using rules and they are able to handle an occasion which has never 
occurred. Therefore, he concludes that: 
 








The above is the social function of the sage and junzi. 
The sage or Junzi, for Xunzi, is necessary for those who learn how to behave 
and transform their desires and emotions in accordance with li. He says:  
 
The sage is the acme of the Way (dao). Therefore, students study how to become a sage 








Why do people have to learn from the sage? For Xunzi, imitating or being 
taught by the sage is necessary in learning because, firstly, the sage can exemplify 
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some excellent moral characters and dispositions of behavior. Cultivating these 
characters and dispositions is one of the ultimate goals of the practice of li. The sage 
can help people understand them by exemplifying them. Furthermore, because of the 
unspecified detail and the way of following li in the Book of Rite, or liji (禮記), 
merely studying the classics is insufficient to be a morally superior man and a 
knowledgeable person. Only by being taught by the sage, can one know how to act in 
accordance with li and its rationale. 
 
In learning, nothing is more profitable than to associate with those who are learned. The 
Ritual and Music present us with models but do not offer explanation; the Odes and 
Documents present matters of antiquity but are not always apposite; the Spring and 
Autumn Annals are laconic and its import cannot be quickly understood. But if one can 
imitate the morally superior persons and learn their explanations, then he or she will 
become honored for his or her comprehensive and catholic acquaintance with the affairs 
of the world. Therefore it is said: “In learning, nothing is more profitable than to associate 
with those who are learned. And of the road to learning, none is quicker than to love those 
who are learned. The next best route is exaltation of li.”
135







The morally superior person not only exemplifies how to behave excellently in 
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accordance with ritual in a particular situation, but also he or she can explain the 
rationale of the li. He or she knows the rationale of li because he or she is able to 
reflect why he or she observes the ritual. 
 
Those who keep to the mean provided by li and are able to ponder and meditate on it are 
said to be able to think. Those who keep to the mean provided by li and are able not to 
alter it are said to be steadfast. One who, being able to think and to stay steadfast, and in 









Therefore, the sage not only can persevere in acting without violating li, but also 
he or she truly loves to follow the li.  
In short, the sage is an ideal model for imitation. Ordinary people and the sage 
both have the capacity of knowing the rationale of li and morality, and the capacity to 
put what they know into practice. Fully developing these capacities is necessary for 
one be a sage. However, only a sage can thoroughly develop these capacities. 
Imitating the sage can help ordinary people to develop these capacities. After a 
long-lasting effort, the sage also develops the capacity to acquire comprehensive 
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knowledge and considering all relevant factors. This capacity is necessary in the 
application and modification of law and ritual rules, in creating li, in learning and 
explaining the classics. Apart from the long-lasting effort, how can people obtain 
comprehensive knowledge and develop the capacity to consider all relevant factors? 
This question leads us to the Xunzi’s account of the human capacity of knowing. I 






Xunzi’s moral knowledge and related issues 
 
3.1 xin 
In the previous section, the functions and characteristics of the sage and junzi 
were discussed. One of the most distinctive characteristics is the ability to consider 
all relevant factors in solving problems. The cultivation of this ability is closely 
related to Xunzi’s conception of cognitive capacity. The main theme of this section is 
further to discuss Xunzi’s account of human cognitive capacity. Xunzi calls this 
faculty of cognition xin (心). In Confucianism, xin has two functions: knowing and 
feeling. Thus, the more appropriate translation is “heart-mind”.
139
 According to 
Xunzi, heart-mind is responsible for knowing, thinking, understanding, forming 
concepts and judgments.
140
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Substantive moral judgments and standards are also known through heart-mind. 
For Xunzi, knowing the standard of morality is necessary for behaving morally. He 
says: “The mind must first understand the Dao before it can approve the Dao, and it 
must first approve the Dao before it can abide by the Dao and reject what is at 
variance with the Dao
142
 (心知道然後可道。可道然後能守道以禁非道).”143 
However, Xunzi thinks that there are twelve factors which can obstruct the 
heart-mind from knowing the truth which includes the moral standard. 
 
What makes for blindness? One can be blinded by desire or aversion, by the beginnings of 
things or their end, by what is remote or what is near, by breadth of knowledge or 
shallowness, by the past or the present. When one makes distinctions among the myriad 
beings of creation, these distinctions all become potential sources of obsession. This is the 








Psychologically, our desire and aversion can influence our perception and 
understanding of things. In the beginning of “Dispelling Blindness” (解蔽篇),146 
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Xunzi adduces some bad consequences being caused by the ancient kings, high 
ministers and lords to argue that firstly, desires and hates can make people want to 
know what is true and right. Secondly, ignoring truth can bring bad consequences. 
Other kings, high ministers and lords in the past are also used to illustrate the point 
that effort in dispelling obsessions can produce good consequences.
147
  
In Xunzi’s works, obsession caused by the beginning or the end of things would 
occur in treating human birth and death. For Xunzi, the birth and death of human 
beings are equally important. He says: “When both beginning and end are good, 
man’s way is complete
148 (生，人之始也；死，人之終也；終始俱善，人道畢矣).”149 
Thus, “[r]ites are strictest in their ordering of birth and death”
150
 (禮者，謹於治生死
者也).151 And “the morally superior person is reverent in his treatment of the 
beginning and careful in his treatment of the end, regarding both with the same 
gravity”
152 (君子敬始而慎終，終始如一).153 Someone who is only reverent in 
treating death is obsessed by the end, and someone who only takes birth seriously is 
obsessed by the beginning. Xunzi condemns both of these obsessions. 
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To be generous on occasions of birth but skimpy in the treatment of the dead is to show 
reverence for a being who has consciousness and contempt for one who has lost it. This is 
the way of an evil man and to have a heart that rebels against nature…To fail to treat the 
living with sincere generosity and reverent formality is the way of a rustic; to fail to bury 
the dead with sincere generosity and reverent formality is the way of a miser. The morally 
superior person despises rusticity and is ashamed of miserliness.
154







Apart from the context of Xunzi’s philosophy, the genetic fallacy is another 
example of the obsession caused by the beginning of things.
156
 In our daily lives, 
many persons think that the beginning of things is right or good. However, this is just 
a bias. They may ignore the fact that, firstly, the beginning of things may be very 
poor. Something can become better as it develops and become quite different from its 
original condition. Neglect of such possibilities may lead us to make mistakes in 
reasoning.  
Our perception can be interfered with by the distance between ourselves and 
what we perceive. This perceptual error is caused by what is remote or what is near. 
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The following is one of the examples of this kind of error found in “Dispelling 
Blindness” (解蔽篇): 
 
If you look down on a herd of cows from the top of a hill, they will look no bigger than 
sheep, and yet no one hoping to find sheep is likely to run down the hill after them. It is 
simply that the distance obscures their actual size. If you look up at a forest from the foot 
of a hill, the biggest trees appear no taller than chopsticks, and yet no one hoping to find 









The knowledge one has can be the source of an obsession. Members of 
primitive tribes misunderstand eclipses as the indication of the anger of God because 
they know nothing about natural science. However, knowing too much without 
organizing and unifying what one knows is bad for people too. Xunzi remarks that 
“[o]ne who, not understanding the moral principles underlying the laws, attempts to 
rectify the norms contained therein, however broad his views, is bound to produce 
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anarchy in what he superintends”159 (不知法之義而正法之數者，雖博臨事必
亂。).160 
Finally, the fallacy of appealing to tradition is the representation of the 
obsession caused by the past. Traditional thought is not necessarily right, though it 
has some important social functions and can benefit us and be supported by some 
reasons. A tradition which was capable of solving many problems in the past could 
fail to solve new problems because it cannot adapt to the changed environment. 
Moreover, some negative or harmful consequences are brought by tradition. For 
example, feminists criticize traditional thought about the social roles of men and 
women in the family. Always following the traditional way may prevent us from 
creating other new and better ways to solve problems. However, this does not imply 
that new inventions, or all new things, or any anti-traditional action must be good. If 
we think so, we are obsessed by the present. Actually, right or wrong, good or bad, or 
truth or falsehood cannot be determined merely by whether the relevant items are 
traditional or new.  
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What is set forth by Xunzi about the causes of misunderstanding the truth does 
not include all obstacles to knowing the truth. However, we can know what results in 
our failure to grasp what the thing really is. Xunzi has already pointed out that most 
obsessions come from the distinctions of things, though people can understand things 
through their distinctions. For Xunzi, only when one knows and considers all aspects 
of things, can one know the truth. We can further understand his conception of truth 
from his criticism of his contemporary thinkers. At the beginning of “Contra Twelve 
Philosophers” (非十二子篇), Xunzi refutes his contemporary rival thinkers by 
saying that all of them only emphasize one aspect of the Dao (道), the truth, but 
neglect other aspects. We can find the same criticism in the last paragraph of “A 
Discussion of Heaven” (天論篇):  
 
The ten thousand beings are only one aspect of dao. One species of beings is only one 
aspect of the ten thousand beings. The stupid man is only one aspect of one species. He 
himself believes that he understands the dao, though of course he does not. Shenzi could 
see the advantages of holding back, but not the advantages of taking the lead. Laozi could 
see the advantages of humbling oneself, but not the advantages of raising one’s station. 
Mozi could see the advantages of uniformity, but not those of diversity. Songzi could see 
the advantages of having few desires, but not those of having many. If everyone holds 
back and no one takes the lead, then there will be no gate to advancement for the people. 
If everyone humbles himself and no one tries to improve his station, then the distinctions 
between eminent and humble will become meaningless. If there is only uniformity and no 
diversity, then the commands of government can never be carried out. If there is only a 
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lessening of desires and never an increase, then there will be no way to educate and 
transform the people. This is what the Documents means when it says: “Do not go by what 











In this passage, Xunzi criticizes contemporary thinkers for failing to know the 
truth because they only emphasize one of the aspects of things. All of them ignore 
other equally important aspects. Their ignorance results in different kinds of 
implausible thinking.  
Moreover, at the beginning of the essay “Dispelling Obsession” (解蔽篇), 
Xunzi explicitly indicates that it is common for people to be obsessed by “only one 
of the aspect of truth and failing to comprehend its overall principles”
163
 (凡人之
患，蔽於一曲，而闇於大理。).164 In line with the previous passages, he also 
criticizes his contemporary rivals for failing to see that what they think of as the truth 
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is just one of the aspects of the Dao: “[W]ith their limited understanding [they] saw 
one aspect of the dao and, failing to understand that it was only an aspect, they 
considered it sufficient and proceeded to expound it in engaging terms”
165
 (曲知之
人，觀於道之一隅，而未之能識也，故以為足而飾之).166 According to Xunzi, the 
true dao “must embody constant principles and be capable of embracing all 
changes”
167
 (夫道者，體常而盡變).168 Thus, “one aspect is an insufficient basis for 
drawing conclusions about it”
169
 (一隅不足以舉之).170 In other words, the theories 
suggested by those thinkers are untenable because they fail to consider all relevant 
aspects of things. This fault results in their theories being far from the truth.  
For Xunzi, sages understand how to know the truth and can prevent themselves 
from being blinded by being concerning with only one aspect of things.    
 
The sage knows the flaws of the mind’s operation and perceives the misfortunes of 
blindness and being closed to the truth. This is why he is without desires and aversions, 
without beginnings and ends of things, without the remote or near, without broadness or 
shallowness, without antiquity or modernity. He lays out all the myriad things and causes 
himself to exactly match how each settles on the suspended balance. This is why for the 
sage, the multitude of different reactions to things cannot produce obsession by one 
thing’s beclouding another and so disturbing their proper position.What is the balance? I 
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However, in the above passage, Xunzi does not explain how sages can know the 
truth by balancing all related factors. His explanation follows: 
 
How does a man understand the Way? Through the mind. And how can the mind 
understand it? Because it is empty, unified, and still. The mind is constantly storing up 
things, and yet it is said to be empty. The mind is constantly marked by diversity, and yet 
it is said to be unified. The mind is constantly moving, and yet it is said to be still. Man is 
born with capacity of knowing, and where there is capacity of knowing there is memory. 
Memory is what is stored up in the mind. Yet the mind is said to be empty because what 
has already been stored up in it does not hinder the reception of new impressions. 
Therefore it is said to be empty. Heart-mind is born with capacity of knowing, and where 
there is capacity of knowing there is an awareness of differences. An awareness of 
differences means that one can have an understanding of a variety of facts at the same 
time, and where there is such understanding, there is diversity. And yet the mind is said to 
be unified because it does not allow the understanding of one fact to impinge upon that of 
another. Therefore it is said to be unified. When the mind is asleep, it produces dreams; 
when it is unoccupied, it wanders off in idle fancy; and if allowed to do so, it will produce 
from these all manner of plots and schemes. Hence the mind is constantly moving. And 
yet it is said to be still, because it does not allow such dreams and noisy fancies to disorder 
its understanding. Therefore it is said to be still. A man who has not yet attained the Dao 
but is seeking it should be urged to take emptiness, unity and stillness as his guides. If he 
who seeks to abide by the Dao has emptiness, then he may enter into it; if he who seeks to 
serve the Dao has unity, then he may master it; if he who seeks to meditate on the Dao has 
stillness, then he may perceive it. He who understands the Dao and perceives its nature, he 
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who understands the Dao and carries it out, may be said to embody the Way. Emptiness, 
unity, and stillness-there are the qualities of great and pure enlightenment.
173












Although Xunzi holds that memory is one of the constituents of knowledge, 
sometimes it can prevent us from acquiring and memorizing new knowledge. Thus, 
heart-mind has to be “empty” (or at least not too full!) in order to acquire new 
knowledge. As for the unity of heart-mind, even though, for Xunzi, knowledge 
comes from the differentiation of things, it is necessary for the heart-mind to be the 
state of what he calls “oneness”. Under this state, the heart-mind can concentrate 
itself to know one thing without being interfered with by what we have known. 
Finally, our heart-mind always operates even though we are sleeping. Dream and 
imagination may disturb us from knowing the truth. To avoid knowing the false by 
the interference of dream or imagination, we have to keep our heart-mind still when 
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we know, perceive, or understand things or events.
175
 If the heart-mind can be empty, 
unified and still, it is in the state of “great and pure enlightenment”. This is the ideal 
state of knowing in which we can free from any subjective mental error and can 
grasp the truth of things.      
 
3.1.1 Xin as a decision maker 
Another function of heart-mind is to be an arbiter and to judge whether it is 
right to act in order to satisfy a desire. In section 2.2.5, when we discussed the 
concept of wei, this decision-making function of heart-mind was introduced. It can 
deliberate and adjudicate whether an emotion is appropriate for acting in accordance 
with. If it is so, heart-mind will approve of the action. In addition to emotion, 
heart-mind can also approve or disapprove of desires. 
 
What men desire most is life, and what they hate most is death. Be that as it may, men 
sometimes follow the pursuit of life and end up with death. It is not that they do not really 
desire life and rather desire death; it is that it proved impossible to continue living and it 
was possible to die. Thus, when desires run to excess, actions do not reach that point 
because the mind stops them. If what the mind permits coincides with reason, then 
although the desires be numerous, how could there be harm to order! Although the desires 
are not strong enough to motivate a person, his actions may exceed his desires because the 
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mind has ordered them to do so. If what the mind permits conflicts with what is 
reasonable, then although the desires be few, how could it stop at disorder! Thus, order 











The heart-mind can choose among desires and emotions, because it can know 
the Dao, that is, what is good and what is bad. When the heart-mind knows the moral 
truth, it will follow it. 
 
All men will abide by what they think is good and reject what they think is bad. It is 
inconceivable, therefore, that any man could understand that there is nothing in the world 








Thus, in Xunzi’s moral philosophy, the truth of moral belief is necessary to its 
being appropriate or genuinely wise.
180
 If heart-mind fails to know the truth of moral 
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rules, it may approve the desires and emotions which can result in bad consequences 
when one acts in accordance with them. The sage knows what things can obsess our 
thinking and avoids them. To avoid obsession, one has to consider all relevant factors 
and should not overlook or overemphasize any one of them. Thus, for Xunzi, the 
sage can keep his or her heart-mind in the perfect status in which he or she can know 
the truth by considering all relevant factors. This characteristic of the sage provides a 
resource for explaining how moral rules can be true when Xunzi’s moral thought is 
reconstructed in terms of subjective naturalism. In the following sections, I will 
elucidate how Xunzi’s moral thought can be reconstructed in terms of this 
contemporary Western metaethical theory. Firstly, I will outline the contemporary 
theories of metaethics so as to be in a better position to situate the line of thought 
known as subjective naturalism.  
 
3.2 The outline of modern naturalism 
Following Finlay’s analysis, contemporary moral realism can be divided into 
four groups: semantic, ontological, metaphysical and normative. Different groups of 
realism argue that moral claims can be true by different strategies. However, no 
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matter what method is taken by various groups of realists, it has to meet two 
requirements. On the one hand, morality has some appearances which lead us to 
concede that moral claims are objective and they can be true. On the other hand, it is 
also required that morality fits with our general and empirical understanding of 
human beings and the world.
181
 In short, emphasizing the objective features of 
morality is the common characteristic of moral realists.  
 
3.2.1 Ontological realism  
To explain what makes moral claims true, ontological realists appeal to moral 
facts, properties, entities, and so on. However, Mackie argues that moral properties 
and moral facts are metaphysically, epistemologically and practically queer. They are 
too queer to be accepted as a part of the world.
182
 
Moral properties or entities are metaphysical queer because they have some 
strange characteristics, such as causal impotence. Since moral properties cannot 
cause anything, it seems that people cannot know them through perception. Some 
philosophers suggest that people can know them through intuition. However, we do 
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not understand what it is and how it operates. This claim just uses one mystery to 
answer a previous mystery. As for practical queerness, ordinarily, people think that 
moral claims connect closely with human motivation and action. However, firstly, it 
is unclear how moral entities can motivate us to act or not to act, because they are 
causal impotent. Secondly, even though some realists suggest a peculiar connection 
between moral reality and human motivation, it dose not fit with our general theories 
of motivation and agency.   
 
3.2.2 Naturalism 
The camp of ontological moral realism gives different responses to the 
antirealist’s challenge because the camp can be further divided into two groups: 
naturalism and non-naturalism. The main difference between naturalism and 
non-naturalism is whether moral properties are natural. The naturalists claim that 
moral properties are natural but the non-naturalists deny it. Ordinarily, natural 
properties are regarded as the objects of the empirical sciences. However, science is a 
general name. It consists of different subjects and each of them has its unique objects 
of study. This implies that the characteristics of objects of sciences are various. They 
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have, however, some basic features, such as spatiotemporal existence, causal 
efficaciousness, and empirical accessibility.
183
 As for non-naturalism, it insists that 
moral terms or concepts cannot be analyzed into natural terms or concepts and moral 
properties cannot be reduced to natural ones.
184
 For non-naturalists, moral properties 
are sui generis. This does not mean, however, that non-naturalists have to identify 
non-natural moral properties with Platonic Ideas or other supernatural properties. 
They propose that moral properties supervene on the natural ones. Furthermore, not 
only some of them deny that natural properties necessarily have causal efficacy,
185
 
but also insist that we can a priori know some important moral facts by intuition.  
The camp of naturalism can be further divided into subjective, objective, 
analytic and non-analytic.
186
 Analytic naturalism holds that moral terms can be 
analyzed in terms of non-moral ones. Non-analytic naturalism, on the one hand, 
insists that moral terms are not synonymous with any non-moral terms. On the other 
hand, it allows that certain natural properties are identical with the properties which 
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are predicated by moral terms.
187
 Subjective and objective naturalism disagree over 
whether the truth of moral claim is attitude-independent. Actually, both of them have 
different forms. The content of subjective naturalism is influenced by the agent’s 
attitudes and traits. The simplest theory of this sort concerns actual agents and 
identifies moral facts with facts about their attitudes. The sophisticated one chooses 
the agent who is perfectly rational and fully informed and identifies moral facts with 
the actions or desires that would be desired or approved by the ideal one. The 
advantage of subjective naturalism is that it accommodates well with the world. We 
can know and investigate the nature of facts about actual or hypothetical attitudes by 
empirical processes. However, it may be hard to maintain the objective pretension of 
moral discourse. Firstly, moral claims do not seem merely to describe one’s attitudes. 
Secondly, the universality of moral requirements may be sacrificed when moral fact 
is based on one’s attitudes. To save the universality of moral requirements, some 
suggest that all rational agents would converge on the same set of desires.
188
 Others 
appeal to the ideal observer or shared attitudes. Richard Joyce argues that it is hard 
for all agents to converge on a common set of desires because the desires of actual 
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agents are too diverse to converge on this common set of desires simply by being 
corrected from the standpoint of a rational agent.
189
 The alternative is unsuccessful 
because it is difficult to give reason to persuade others to conform to the attitudes of 
others. After briefly introducing these contemporary theories of metaethics, 
especially naturalism, I will try to elucidate that Xunzi’s moral thought is compatible 
with subjective realism.  
 
3.3 Subjective realism and Xunzi’s moral thought 
As discussed before, subjective natural realism identifies moral facts with the 
agent’s attitudes or desires. Given our discussion of Xunzi’s moral thought, the sage, 
or in some contexts, the morally superior person, can be regarded as the ideal agent. 
Marshall reconstructs Xunzi’s sage king as an ideal legislator.
190
 On this view, the 
moral status of an act is determined by whether it violates or is allowed by a rule 
legislated by the sage king. If an act X is uncontroversially proscribed by some 
uncontroversially moral or ritual rule, then X is morally wrong. The moral judgment 
“X is wrong” is objectively true.
191
 In other words, the truth of the moral judgment 
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is constituted by the fact that this act is proscribed or is allowed by a particular moral 
or ritual rule legislated by the sage king.  
Some may challenge the idea that the sage king is necessary as one of the key 
truth conditions of any moral judgment. Given the above analysis, it is clear that 
what makes the judgment “X is wrong” true is the wide-accepted uncontroversial 
moral or ritual rule. Since this rule is accepted by the most of the members of a 
community, the wrongness of any action which results from the violation of this rule 
is also widely accepted within the group. Thus, what makes the judgment “any act 
which is proscribed by this rule is wrong” true is the fact that most of the members in 
this society accept this rule and the moral standard implied from it. If this analysis is 
correct, the sage king is redundant for the truth of any moral judgment.      
Marshall thinks that the sage king is necessary for making any moral judgment 
true or false because a law would be accepted by the people when the sage king 
legislates it. Based on the character of the sage king, Marshall says, the law deserves 
people’s respect and allegiance. The law has authority because the benevolence of 
the king is expressed through legislating it.
192
  
Marshall’s work primarily reveals that the moral philosophy of Xunzi is 




compatible with subjective naturalism. However, he just sketches the structure of the 
theory.  I try to further develop his theory to give a more detail account of Xunzi’s 
perspective on moral knowledge. Railton’s moral realism will be adapted to that end. 
 
3.3.1 Railton’s account of non-moral value 
For Railton, a thing has non-moral value when “it is desirable for someone or 
good for him.”
193
 Actually, when I judge that “it is desirable for me” that just means 
“I desire it”. However, this definition is untenable because we may desire x in a 
situation where I am not well-informed, or where I miscalculate the consequence of 
getting the thing desired, or where I confuse the thing wanted with other things, or 
ignore some other relevant factors, and so on. In Xunzi’s words, under these 
conditions, our desire for x is based on obsession, bi (蔽).  
To refine the definition, the ideal self is introduced. This self desires one thing 
in a condition in which he or she is free from ignorance, miscalculation and is fully 
informed, etc. Thus, A is desirable for a person P when P would desire A if P were 
fully informed and ideally rational. 
The Problem of this refined definition is that the ideal self does not desire a 
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thing which is desired by the actual self in a given situation. Thus, the ideal self is 
useless for the actual self. For example, the actual self of Alex desires to call his 
friend to ask how to go to Tuen Mun (屯門) from Tai Po (大埔). But his ideal self, 
who is already fully informed, does not desire to phone his friend. To connect the 
ideal self and the actual one, the definition is refined as follows: 
 
A is desirable for a person P when ideal self P desires the non-ideal self P to desire A. The 
ideal self is unqualified cognitive and [has] imaginative powers, and full factual and 
nomological information about his physical and psychological constitution, capacities, 
circumstances, history, and so on… has completed and vivid knowledge of himself and his 




To examine whether his account of non-moral value can characterize the facts 
about non-moral value, Railton addresses two criteria for a generic stratagem of 




1) Independence: it exists and has certain determinate features independent of whether we 
think it exists or has those features, independent, even, of whether we have good reason 
to think this; 
 
2) Feedback: it is such-and we are such-that we are able to interact with it, and this 
interaction exerts the relevant sort of shaping influence or control upon our perceptions, 
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thought, and action.   
 
Railton makes use of the following example to illustrate how his account of 
non-moral value can meet these two requirements.  
Lonnie feels lethargic when he travels in a foreign country and he desires to 
drink milk. However, he does not know that he is seriously dehydrated. Lethargy is 
the symptom of dehydration. Drinking milk only makes him worse.
196
 Now, assume 
that his ideal self has full information and is rational; in that case he will desire the 
actual self not to desire milk and will desire water instead. But Lonnie finally drinks 
milk and feels much worse. Consider other visitor, Tad. He desires water. His ideal 
self desires his actual self to desire water. Railton claims his notion of non-moral 
goods can explain the difference. Lonnie feels worse because his desire does not 
coincide with what was desirable for him. Ted feels better because his desire 
coincides with what was desirable for him. Railton claims that if Ted desires water 
because he has known it already through learning, training, or whatsoever, we can 
explain that Ted feels better because he has known what is good for him.
197
  
Railton explains how his notion of non-moral value can fulfill the conditions of 
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independence and feed-back. As for the condition of independence, even though 
what is desirable for Lonnie in the given circumstance is constituted by how the ideal 
self of Lonnie stands in the position of the actual self, the ideal one would be 
desirable for the actual Lonnie to want, the truth of what is desirable is not merely 
what Lonnie, whether ideal or non-ideal, thinks or has good reason to think. The 
truth of it also depends on other facts. For example, if water is desirable for the 
actual Lonnie, the truth that water is desirable for Lonnie is not merely based on the 
ideal Lonnie’s desire; there are other facts which the ideal Lonnie has to consider in 
deciding whether water or milk is desirable. Those facts include Lonnie’s 




As for the condition of feedback, Railton explains it by means of how his notion 
of non-moral good explains the evolution of one’s desire. Assume that Lonnie feels 
bad after drinking milk. He cannot fall asleep and goes out to buy milk. However, all 
the milk in the store is sold out. The boss of the store gives him a bottle of clear 
liquid to satisfy him. He goes back and drinks the unknown liquid before falling 
asleep. After waking up, he feels better. Since he still wants to drink milk, he goes to 
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the store again. The milk has been delivered. However, since he feels better, it leads 
him to buy the unknown liquid rather than milk. He drinks it and feels much better. 
Finally, he drinks the unknown liquid during the journey.
199
 Initially, he desires milk, 
but after getting the pleasure from drinking the unknown liquid which is actually 
desirable for him, he changes his desire. Finally, he loses the desire for milk and 
desires the unknown liquid in similar situations in the future. Thus, the fact about 
what is desirable for him explains why his desire evolves.  
Furthermore, these sorts of explanations, Railton suggests, may support some 
qualified predictions. Firstly, when one obtains more information and experience, 
one’s knowledge of one’s good should increase. Secondly, people with similar 
personal and social characteristics will tend to have similar value in some 
circumstances because the ideal self will take into account what her actual self is like 
and her circumstances. Thirdly, in some areas of life, where individuals are most 
alike in some aspects, what is good for one person will tend to approach what is good 
for another.  Fourth, we would expect that, ceteris paribus, one will judge what is 
good for oneself better than others do because a person’s good is determined by what 
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his fully informed and ideally rational self would want her to want given her actual 
circumstances.
200
    
As for moral value, Railton’s account can be expressed in the following form: 
 
x is morally right if and only if x would be approved of by an ideally instrumentally 
rational and fully informed agent considering the question ‘How best to maximize the 
amount of non-moral goodness?’ from a social point of view in which the interests of all 




There are several points worth noting here. Firstly, Railton insists that a social 
point of view is required in accounting for moral value. He enumerates the 
distinctive features of moral norms. The criteria of choice which determine moral 
resolutions are non-indexical and comprehensive; pure prudential reasons may be 
subordinated; moral evaluation concerns the assessment of conduct or character, 
rationality of moral norms is not from a point of view of particular individual.
202
 The 
above distinctive features of morality emphasize impartiality. Thus, he insists that an 
impartial social point of view is necessary for moral value. Impartiality requires us to 
consider every individual. Thus, the interests of all potentially affected individuals 
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were counted equally. Railton thinks that non-moral value and moral value, in some 
sense, are parallel. Both of them can explain and affect people’s behavior. When the 
arrangement of a society does not coincide with instrumental rationality and the 
social point of view in which the interests of all potentially affected individuals were 
counted equally, social dissatisfaction occurs. A society that departs from social 
rationality might undergo social unrest. Those whose interests are discounted 
unreasonably will not follow or will rebel against the current social system. Thus, 
feedback mechanism exists in moral value too. The evolution of social structures can 
be explained in term of social rationality.
203
 
Having introduced Railton’s subjective naturalism, I will next show how 
Xunzi’s moral thought can be reconstructed as a form of subjective naturalism.  
 
3.3.2 Xunzi’s subjective naturalism 
To reconstruct Xunzi’s moral thought as a contemporary subjective naturalism, 
the sage is the significant element. As discussed above, the sage, as an ideal, knows 
all the sources of obsessions. In other words, he or she is free from any fault of 
irrationality. The sage attempts to know all aspects of things and to consider all 
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relevant factors in handling a problem, in judging other behavior, in deciding what he 
or she should do, and in creating moral and ritual rules. In other words, the sage 
considers everything. In this sense, the sage is similar to Railton’s ideal self. He or 
she, after cultivation, can keep his or her mind empty, unified and still. In this state, 
the heart-mind is free from any obsession and does not ignore or consider only one of 
the aspects of things. The heart-mind of the sage can consider all relevant aspects of 
things. In this state, one can know the Dao. The Dao consists of all aspects of things. 
After the heart-mind knows the Dao, it can adjudicate the appropriateness of 
emotions and desires and decide which emotions and desires should be allowed to 
motivate action. One example is the creation of li. Xunzi says the sage hates disorder 
and chaos. Thus, he or she creates li to curb human desires, to transform human 
emotions, to divide people into different social status. The forming of li can be 
expressed in the following way: 
 
1) The sage hates disorder and desires order and anything which can bring order 
when he or she is free from mistakes of thinking, knows and considers all 
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relevant aspects, is rational, etc.
204
  
2) The sage, in an ideal condition, knows that people struggling over the means 
for satisfying their own desires is the cause of disorder. He also knows that 
human desires are unlimited. But he knows that human beings have some 
capacities and wants which go beyond the basic human needs. 
3) The sage, in an ideal condition, knows that division, fen (分) is one of the 
capacities of human beings. He knows the amount of resources in society. He 
knows the amount of resources needed to satisfy all members of society. He 
also knows the amount of resources required to satisfy the basic needs of each 
particular person. He knows the productive power of each member.  
4) The sage, in an ideal condition, knows the way of dividing the resources 
which can satisfy the particular basic needs of each member. He also knows 
the ways of allocating work to each member so as to maximize production. 
He knows his way of dividing resources and workloads can bring order to the 
society.  
5) The sage, in an ideal condition, desires this division.   
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This way of division is li. I borrow Railton’s subjective naturalism and modify it 
to allege that moral goodness is what is desirable by the sage who is in an ideal 
condition.  
I will show how my account of Xunzi’s conception of moral goodness can fulfill 
two conditions suggested by Railton. Firstly, a thing is good not only because we 
think that it is or because we have good reason to think that it is. The above example 
of the creation of li reveals that there are other facts, such as human nature, capacity, 
the amount of resources, etc, that determine that li is good. Thus, my account can 
fulfill the condition of independence. As for the condition of feedback, consider a 
man X who lives outside the community in which li is established. X enjoys his life 
because he is free. However, sometimes, he is angered by some inconvenience in 
daily life. He lives alone so he has to maintain his house, find food, and perform 
other tasks. One day, he goes to the community to find job. A restaurant employs him 
but he has to stay in the staff hostel. To earn money, he accepts the offer. At first, he 
cannot adapt to the community life because he has to obey the li. Generally, he can 
live conveniently because of the division of labor. Before living in the community, it 
is very troublesome when he gets sick because no one takes care of him or works for 
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him. He also has to seek for food and handle much housework. After working in the 
community, even though he gets sick, he can rest in the hostel, have his lunch and 
dinner without cooking by himself. He wants to stay in the community and work. At 
first, Mr. X has no desire to stay in this ritual community. Generally, he gets pleasure 
from the ritual life. Finally, he has no desire to leave the community. But he develops 
a desire for living in the community. Thus, the fact of moral goodness transforms his 
desire. If what I say is true, then my account can satisfy the condition of feedback.  
In the following sections, I will discuss some implications for Xunzi’s 
philosophy. 
 
3.4 Normative ethics and metaethics 
I think Xunzi’s moral thought has some implications for the issue of the relation 
between normative ethics and metaethics. As the study of the meanings of the moral 
terms, such as ‘ought’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, etc, and the meanings of the moral judgments, 
metaethics appears in the early twentieth century. Sometimes, metaethics is regarded 
as a reflection of normative ethics. However, the relation between these two orders of 
moral theories is unclear. Generally, there are two different statements about their 
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relation. Some say that meta-ethics is normatively neutral. On the other hand, some 
think that different kinds of relation, such as entailment, causal effect, etc., exist 
between ethical theories and meta-ethical theories. I call the former neutralists and 
the latter non-neutralists. About the question ‘are meta-ethical theories normatively 





1) Do metaethical analyses affect one’s moral life? 
2) Are metaethical theories logical entailments of normative ethical positions? 
3) Do metaethical theories logically entail certain normative ethical statements?  
4) Do metaethical theories logically entail certain accounts of moral justification? 
5) Are metaethical theories set forth simply and solely as descriptively true theories rather 
than as prescriptions concerning the way moral language ought to be used and 
interpreted? 
6) Do metaethical theories have a normative function? 
 
Blackstone gives a positive answer to questions 1), 4) and 6), while his answer 
to 3) and 5) are negative. As for the answer to question 2), he insists that metaethical 
theories are neutral on normative ethical positions, even though some first-order 
ethical theories are entailed by meta-level ethical theories. I summarize and discuss 
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his arguments which support his answers to those questions below. 
 
3.4.1 Metaethical theory and one’s moral life 
Blackstone thinks that one’s view of morality is affected by committing oneself 
to a particular metaethical theory, though this is not necessary. Generally, the nature 
of moral judgments and their justification will be changed by a particular metaethical 
point of view. For example, if we accept the emotivist’s account of the nature of 
moral judgment, our view of and attitude toward moral judgment will change to be 
that rationality and reason are excluded from ethical discourse because all ethical 
statements just express one’s feelings or emotions, which cannot be true or false. 
Furthermore, the justification of moral judgment is annihilated under emotivism. All 
of these views also affect one’s life since evaluating other ethical judgments, and 
making and justifying our own moral judgments are indispensable to our daily life. 
In a society where emotivism is prevalent, the relationship among people will be 
manipulative and everyone becomes a means for achieving other persons’ goals.
206
 
Thus, one’s moral life can be affected by metaethical theories.  
                                                
206




3.4.2. Normative ethical theories and metaethical theories 
In the history of ethics, we can find some cases where normative ethical theory 
entails metaethical theory. For example, due to his commitment to the principle of 
utility, the meanings of all ethical terms are specified by utilitarianism in Bentham’s 
ethics. However, Blackstone thinks that it is not the case that Bentham defines ethical 
terms in terms of his own normative ethical commitment.
207
 Since metaethics need 
not commit one to any particular ethical view, it is morally neutral. 
 
3.4.3 Metaethical theories and moral judgment 
Even though our moral life and an account of moral justification are both 
affected by different metaethical discourse, Blackstone thinks that metaethical 
theories are neutral with regard to any normative ethical statement.
208
 One’s 
metaethical state has no any connection with a particular moral judgment. In other 
words, whatever you are an emotivist, realist or intuitionist, you can still make a 
claim that killing a cat for fun is morally wrong. However, this neutral thesis of 
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metaethics is false. Error theory, one of the metaethical theories, is a metaethical 
view that all moral judgment is false. If one adopts this view, one should not believe 
any moral judgment and one should abandon belief in all first-order moral theories. 
After all, holding false beliefs is irrational.
209
 Error theory exemplifies that some 
metaethical theories are no neutral in relation to normative ethical statements.  
 
3.4.4 Metaethical theories and moral justification 
A particular metaethical theory can alter one’s moral life because it can change 
one’s conception of justifying moral judgment and the view of what one is doing 
when one makes a moral judgment. Obviously, the account of moral justification is 
entailed by a specific metaethical standpoint. I have illustrated this by means of 
emotivism previously. Thus I do not say more about this. 
 
3.4.5 The descriptive or prescriptive role of metaethics 
Blackstone adduces emotivism and intuitionism to deny that metaethical 
theories are normatively neutral. Both theories do not simply describe the use of 
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moral language. Even though there are numerous examples showing that moral 
judgment can be true, (for example, moral judgments can take the form of indicative 
sentences, they are the object of cognitive verbs, such as “know”, “believe”, and 
appraisal terms can be applied to them) emotivists still argue that it is not their real 
meaning. In this way, emotivists implicitly adduce some norm to prescribe the use 
and interpretation of moral terms.
210
   
 
3.4.6 Metaethical theories and normative function 
Metaethical theories have a normative function. Normative ethical theories can 
introduce greater rationality into human life when metaethical theory clarifies the 
nature and logic of human moral experience. He adduces five criteria suggested by 
Paul Taylor to test the ability of metaethical theories to increase rationality in our 




1) Contribution of factual understanding of moral practice in daily life; 
2) Contribution of analysing moral discourse for better recognizing the ambiguity, 
vagueness and the purpose of uses of moral language; 
3) Contribution of clear and intelligent use of first-order moral discourse; 
4) Explicating rules of valid reasoning which are appropriate to moral argument and 
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comparing and contrasting rules of valid moral reasoning with rules of valid reasoning 
in other subjects; 
5) Clearly showing the application of rules of valid moral reasoning in daily life. 
 
Actually, criteria 2, 3, 4, 5 highly depend upon 1. Understanding more about 
what is happening in daily moral practice, it is much easier for us to recognize the 
ambiguity and vagueness of moral terms, and carry on the daily moral discourse 
clearly and intelligently. If moral discourse just expresses emotion, then the existence 
of a rule of valid moral reason is problematic. Since criterion one is extremely 
significant, every significant metaethical theory has to at least partly describe the 
uses and meanings of moral terms. Actually, several metaethical theories describe 
different functions and roles of moral concepts. Thus, Blackstone suggests that “a 





3.4.7 Response from Xunzi’s perspective 
Blackstone understands metaethics as the subject of analyzing the meaning of 
moral terms and discourse. Although Xunzi mainly focuses on the truth of moral 
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judgment, he also concerns the meanings and uses of moral terms as well as 
justification. He emphasizes the correct use of moral terms. The fully informed and 
fully rational sage can adjudicate the reasonableness of moral rules. However, I still 
focus on his account of moral truth in order to understand the relation between 
normative ethics and metaethics.
213
 In Xunzi’s moral thought, the truth of morality is 
the foundation of his whole ethical practice. The rationale of li is based on the sage’s 
creation. As a fully informed and fully rational ideal, the sage knows the truth of 
right and good and establishes moral rules based on moral truths. Obviously, the 
metaethical standpoint strongly supports the normative statements, such as ritual 
(moral) rules.  
Xunzi understands moral good as order and harmony. Thus, the whole ritual 
practice aims at and is designed to maintain these two states. Through the practice of 
li, social order can be retained, human emotions remain in a stable state because of 
the appropriate expression prescribed by li. All these points reveal the firm 
connection between normative and metaethical ethics in Xunxi’s moral thought. 
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3.5 The pragmatic goal of pursuing knowledge 
Although the truth of morality is necessary for Xunzi’s moral philosophy, it 
does not follow that he has a great interest in theoretical knowledge. The pursuit of 
the truth of moral belief is never for its own sake, but for moral or other pragmatic 
purposes. Sages and junzi, the ideal model in Xunzi’s philosophy, completely reflect 
this kind of attitude toward knowledge. Even though sages and junzi can well 
develop their heart-mind to know the truth, this does not mean that they know all the 
truth in the universe.  
 
When the morally superior person is termed “wise,” this does not imply that he can know 
all that knowledgeable men know. When he is termed “discriminating,” this does not 
mean that he is able to discriminate all that dialecticians can discriminate. When he is 
termed an “exacting investigator,” this does not mean that he can investigate with 









For Xunzi, there is something sages and junzi do not know, not because of the 
limitation of human ability, but because they selectively acquire knowledge. 
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The constellations follow their revolutions; the sun and moon alternately shine; the four 
seasons succeed each other in good order; the Yin and Yang go through their great 
transformation; and the wind and rain spread out everywhere. Each of the myriad things 
must be in a harmonious relation with Heaven in order to grow, and each must obtain 
from Heaven the proper nurture in order to become complete. We do not perceive the 
process, but we perceive the result—this indeed is why we call it ‘divine.’ All realize that 
Heaven has brought completion, but none realize its formlessness—this indeed is why we 









The sentence “Only the sage acts not seeking to know Nature” has two 
meanings.  
In one of the senses, the sage does not seek to know the meaning and indication 
alluded by natural phenomena. For Xunzi, there are no such allusions in any natural 
phenomenon because nature or heaven is purposeless. Actually, the essay “A 
Discussion of Heaven” elucidates this view of nature.
218
 A sage does not need to 
know how natural phenomena are brought about. He or she only needs to know how 
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to make use of things in the world.
219
 The pursuit of knowledge is not unconditional. 
For Xunzi, knowing the true moral criteria is necessary for establishment of li, 




As a general principle, the faculty of knowing belongs to the inborn nature of man. That 
things are knowable is a part of the natural principle of order of things. Men use their 
inner faculty of knowing to seek the natural principles of order, which allow things to be 
known. But if no boundary to the search is fixed, then even to the end of your life you will 
be incapable of knowing everything …Thus, true learning inherently has a terminus to 
study. Where is its terminus? I say that it is at complete sufficiency. Who has such 
sufficiency? I say it is the sage [king]. Sageliness consists in a comprehensive grasp of the 
natural relationship between men. True kingship consists in a comprehensive grasp of the 
regulations for government… Hence, the student should take the sage king as his teacher 
and the regulations of the sage king as the model. By patterning himself after their 
example, he seeks out their guiding principles and general categories and devotes his 










Apart from reiterating the significance of the sage or the ideal model, Xunzi, in 
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this passage, explicitly claims that the goal of knowing is not knowledge itself. We 
should know what can serve pragmatic and moral purposes: 
 
The [officials] charged with recording the events of Heaven simply observe that its 
configurations can be fixed by regular periods. Those charged with recording the affairs of 
Earth simply observe how its suitability for crops can foster yields. Those charged with 
recording the events of the four seasons simply observe how their sequence can give order 
to the tasks of life. Those charged with recording the Yin and Yang simply observe how 








The above quotation reveals a strong pragmatic tendency toward the purpose of 
acquiring knowledge. Xunzi’s attitude toward knowledge can be summarized in his 
words: 
 
In regard to the myriad things of Heaven and Earth, [junzi, morally superior person,] does 
not devote his attention to theorizing about how they came to be as they are, but rather 
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Although in Xunzi’s philosophy, knowledge serves other purposes and is not 
pursued for it own sake, his ethical thought requires him to seek for the propositional 
knowledge about the things in the world because the truth of moral judgment is 
partly based on the truth of things. In this sense, propositional knowledge is essential 
for his moral thought. Without knowing the truth of things, people cannot grasp the 
Dao and then they cannot determine what is right, so they lose the direction and 
guidance of moral action. Ritual rules lose their objectivity. Learning is useless 
because no thing can be learnt. It is, actually, much worse than the situation in which 
there is no li because there is no sage, without whom li cannot be created. Thus, the 
truth of propositional knowledge is essential for Xunzi’s moral thought. 
 
3.6 Truth and justification 
In “Contra Twelve Philosophers” ( 非 十 二 子 篇 ), Xunzi criticizes his 
contemporary thinkers’ failure to consider all relevant and significant factors. 
However, although their thoughts are only based on one aspect of things, “they have 




 (然而其持之有故，其言之成理，足以欺惑愚眾).228 The 
truth of moral belief is necessary for Xunzi’s moral philosophy. We have known that, 
in his time, there were different claims about how to restore the social order and most 
of them can be supported and defended by reasons. In other words, these various 
thoughts are justified. However, Gettier’s examples reveal that justification can cheat 
us and misdirect us away from truth.
229
 From Xunzi’s criticism of his contemporary 
thinkers, we can assume that he knows this point. For him, only proving the truth of 
his thought can distinguish his thought from others and defeat them. Thus, it is 
plausible to assume that Xunzi takes the truth of belief, especially moral ones, 
seriously. It is also plausible to conceive that he would oppose replacing truth with 
justification. Although he takes a pragmatic attitude toward knowledge, this does not 
imply that he holds a pragmatic view of truth. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has elucidated the content of li and the distinctive characteristics of 
the sage, their relation and their role in Xunzi’s moral thought. It has also considered 
how Xunzi’s moral thought can be interpreted in terms of Railton’s subjective 
naturalism. Under this interpretation, the Xunzian sage becomes an ideal person who 
is fully informed and who has perfect instrumental rationality. His or her desires and 
attitudes also become the basis of the truth of moral judgments. Thus, Xunzi’s moral 
thought can be moral knowledge because it can be true.  
I want to briefly to introduce some difficulties of subjective naturalism to round 
off the thesis, without, however, attempting to give a systematic response to all of the 
difficulties facing proponents of subjective naturalism. Actually, in the section 3.2.2, 
some difficulties of subjective naturalism were mentioned and I shall not repeat them 
here. I want to address myself, however to two additional difficulties. The first 
difficulty concerns motivation. Apparently, one’s ideal self does not motivate a 
person to act in accordance with what his or her ideal self desires him or her to do. 
The self of a person is what he or she actually is, not what the ideal is or would be. 
Thus, subjective naturalism fails to account for the sources of moral motivation. 
 102 
Secondly, since one’s ideal self and one’s actual self are distinct and people find it 
hard, to say the least, to approximate the ideal self, the ideal self cannot have 
first-hand experience of relevant things and actions. The accuracy of the information 
acquired by the ideal sage is questionable.  
Although I cannot give a detail response to these difficulties, I think Xunzi’s 
moral thought contain some helpful resources. Emphasizing learning and 
long-lasting effort in participating in the practice of li in Xunzi’s moral thought may 
provide a method for subjective naturalism to overcome the problem of moral 
motivation and the lack of first-hand experience. I believe that even though Xunzi’s 
moral thought may not solve all of the difficulties of subjective naturalism, it 
contains rich resources for establishing some interesting and innovative responses to 
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